6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
•
identified
“key drivers” that would determine the extent and nature of
post-
conflict
engagement, including levels of consent and damage to
Iraq’s
infrastructure;
and
•
listed
pre-invasion planning tasks, including establishing an
FCO/DFID/
MOD
“framework plan”.
567.
The 30
September edition of the SPG paper on UK strategic military
thinking
included an
expanded section on what it called the “aftermath – resolution
phase”, the
word
“resolution” added in recognition of the possibility of a
non-military, diplomatic
resolution
to the Iraq crisis.304
568.
The paper
summarised what was known about current conditions in
Iraq:
“•
Iraq though
suffering from economic sanctions has great natural
wealth,
adequate
water resources (with an antiquated urban distribution network)
and
an
agricultural sector that is capable of producing food though in
need of reform.
•
Security
structures are bound to the current leadership through ties of
kinship
and
patronage at senior levels, and economic advantage and fear at the
bottom.
•
Iraq has a
sophisticated though choking bureaucracy.
•
Iraqi
infrastructure is poorly maintained by the current regime with
damage from
the war of
1991 still not repaired, and water supplies becoming contaminated
in
major urban
centres.
•
Population
has been ethnically mixed by current regime by internal
displacement
to weaken
opposition; however though mixed ethnic, cultural, and
religious
divides
persist with old scores remaining unsettled.
•
Indebtedness
to Russia. Other regional debts may also exist.”
569.
On US policy
the paper stated:
“•
US plans
envisage a period of military authority exercised through a
military
governor.
This would be followed by a gradual transition to civil authority
and
finally
Iraqi self-rule.
•
Allied to
this is an extensive programme to dismantle and remove elements
of
the Iraqi
regime closely related to Ba’athist rule.
•
The UK will
need to assess whether it can comfortably support the US intent
to
provide
military stewardship rather than rapidly establishing an Iraqi
transitional
authority
at the earliest opportunity.
•
The US
desire to remove the influence of the previous regime may also
run
counter to
the need for basic administration and governance, further
increasing
the
reliance on external authority. This may prove
counter-productive.”
304
Paper
[SPG], 30 September 2002, ‘UK Military Strategic Thinking on
Iraq’.
209