The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
777.
Ms Short set
out her views in a letter to Mr Blair before the
meeting:
“… the
reconstruction of Iraq without an explicit UN mandate would
breach
international
law. Without the UN mandate the Coalition would be an
occupying
army with
humanitarian duties under the Geneva Convention, but – like the
Israelis
in the
Occupied Territories – without any rights to change institutional
arrangements.
The UN is
clear that without the right mandate they could only respond to
immediate
humanitarian
needs. My understanding is that the US has not yet accepted all
our
arguments
on the UN role. Unless they do, DFID could do no more than
support
UN humanitarian
efforts, and few others would be willing to engage.
…
“You should
be aware that the US and the international humanitarian
community
are not
properly prepared to deal with the immediate humanitarian issues.
Visits
to
Washington suggest that the newly created US Office for
Reconstruction
and Humanitarian
Assistance is well led but under-staffed, under-resourced
and
under-prepared
for the scale of the challenge …
“But the US
is improving its humanitarian preparedness daily. A little more
time
would make
the US much better able to deal with some of the
humanitarian
consequences
of conflict. My department is doing what we can to advise the
UK
military on
preparations for delivering humanitarian assistance including in
the
initial
absence of the UN and most international NGOs. We too could also be
better
prepared
given more time.
“You must
also be aware that without resources larger than my whole
contingency
reserve –
just under £100m – it would be impossible for DFID to take a
leading role
in
humanitarian delivery in the South-East …”336
778.
Ms Short’s
letter was also sent to Mr Brown, Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon.
779.
On 6 March,
Mr Blair chaired the first Ministerial meeting convened
solely
to address
humanitarian and other post-conflict issues.
780.
Officials
recommended that the UK should not seek responsibility for
general
administration
of a geographical area of Iraq in the medium term and
pressed
Ministers
to take an urgent decision on the issue.
781.
No decision
was taken.
782.
Officials
asked Ministers to agree a new set of objectives and
guiding
principles
for the post-conflict occupation of Iraq.
783.
The
objectives and guiding principles were not discussed at the
meeting.
336
Letter
Short to Blair, 5 March 2003, ‘Post Conflict Iraq: UN and US
Roles’.
450