The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1156.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit commented that advice to Mr Hoon rather underplayed
“the
issues
surrounding the Amphibious Force and the point that they will
probably be there
earlier for
an ‘ugly’ [start] than ground forces”.452
1157.
Sir David
Manning drew Mr Blair’s attention to the uncertainties
if
operations
started before mid‑February or Turkey refused to agree to the
transit
of UK
troops.
1158.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair that the “two key working
assumptions” were
that “US
forces must be ready to move by 15 February”, and that they would
be “able to
transit
Turkey”.453
The
February date was “a guess”, but it fitted with what he had
been
told by
Dr Rice “about putting pressure on Saddam and resolving the
Iraqi issue sooner
rather than
later”. Sir David’s view was that Turkey would probably agree
to the transit
of US
forces “in the end” but it was “not at all certain that agreement
to US transit will
extend to
[the] UK”.
1159.
Sir David
recommended that Mr Blair authorise the MOD to proceed,
although
he commented
that the letter was “silent on two major
uncertainties”:
•
what would
happen if Saddam provoked a start earlier than 15 February;
and
•
whether
there was a Plan B for UK forces in the event that Turkey
refused
transit.
1160.
Sir David
also raised concerns about the MOD’s media handling strategy
which
he thought
they should discuss with Mr Campbell.
1161.
Sir David
proposed that Mr Blair should discuss the issues with
Mr Hoon and
possibly
Adm Boyce after his (Sir David’s) return from
Washington:
“In
particular, they [the MOD] need to explain how we handle ‘ugly’
start; and what
we do if
the Turks won’t let us deploy for the northern
option.”
1162.
Mr Blair
authorised the preparatory steps requested, including those
relating to
land
forces, but asked that there should be “no change in media handling
until a media
strategy
has been drawn up and agreed with No.10”.454
1163.
Mr Blair
also asked for a meeting with Mr Hoon explicitly to discuss
how the UK
“would
handle a possible ‘ugly start’, and what our options would be for
UK land forces
if Turkey
refused transit”.
1164.
Mr Campbell’s
advice on a media strategy is addressed in Section
3.6.
452
Manuscript
comment Tebbit on Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10
December 2002,
‘Iraq:
Military Planning – Briefing for Meeting with Prime Minister on 11
December’.
453
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 6 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
454
Letter
Rycroft to Watkins, 9 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
350