The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
which we
have to achieve our ends – that of the elimination of Iraq’s
WMD
capacity;
but the latter has to be the goal;
(ii) on
whether any military action would require a fresh UNSC mandate
(Desert
Fox did
not). The US are likely to oppose any idea of a fresh mandate.
On
the other
side, the weight of legal advice here is that a fresh mandate
may
well be
required. There is no doubt that a new UNSCR would transform
the
climate in
the PLP. Whilst that (a new mandate) is very unlikely, given
the
US’s
position, a draft resolution against military action … could play
very
badly
here.”
473.
Addressing the
consequences of military action, Mr Straw wrote:
“A legal
justification is a necessary but far from sufficient pre-condition
for military
action. We
have also to answer the big question – what will this action
achieve?
There seems
to be a larger hole in this than on anything. Most of the
assessments
from the US
have assumed regime change as a means of eliminating
Iraq’s
WMD threat.
But none has satisfactorily answered how that regime change is
to
be secured,
and how there can be any certainty that the replacement regime
will
be better.
“Iraq has
had no
underlying
history of democracy so no-one has this habit or
experience.”
474.
Mr Straw also
wrote:
“I will
talk to you about handling the PLP. But one thing which would help
greatly is
agreeing
that any UK action would have to be endorsed by a substantive
resolution
of the
Commons. There is precedent for this – in the Gulf War. It makes
the
Government
look weak and condescending to its own parliamentary party, to
evade
a
substantive vote. A more messy alternative expression of dissent
(on the division
for the
adjournment) cannot be avoided if there is no substantive vote. The
question
will also
be asked of you – if there can be substantive votes on a trivial
issue like
hunting,
why not on war?”
475.
Mr Straw’s
minute does not appear to have been sent to anyone outside
No.10.166
476.
A minute from
Mr Patey states that Mr Straw and Mr Blair were due to meet
on
26 March
to discuss “amongst other things, Iraq”.167
477.
An undated
manuscript note from Mr Powell to Mr Blair suggested that Mr
Straw
wanted to
discuss his advice.168
166
Minute
Straw to Prime Minister, 25 March 2002,
‘Crawford/Iraq’.
167
Minute
Patey to Goulty, 25 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Action’.
168
Manuscript
comment Powell to PM, [undated], on Minute Straw to Prime Minister,
25 March 2002,
‘Crawford/Iraq’.
472