3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
833.
Repeating many
of the points in his Note to President Bush of 24
January,
Mr Rycroft
reported that Mr Blair said that:
“… having
consulted other leaders it was clear that the issue was not time
for its
own sake
but time to secure a second resolution. Leaving aside public
opinion,
a second
resolution would help protect us against any unexpected events
during
a military
campaign. Saddam had no intention of complying with 1441 so
Bush
was right
to ensure that this did not drag on. The Prime Minister thought
that we
needed two
more Blix reports, one every two weeks, to build up a pattern of
Iraqi
non‑co‑operation.
At that point, all other countries including France could
possibly
come on
side for a second resolution. But they would need a reason to
change
their
position, which Blix’s reports could provide. For instance, it
would be difficult
for Putin
to support a second resolution next week but he might do so in the
future.
This could
make it impossible for France to attract sufficient support. If
they vetoed
alone, the
French would be the unilateral ones.”
834.
Following a
discussion of President Bush’s position, Mr Blair accepted
that there
would be a
need to “maintain a position of strength and exhibit increased
confidence
in our
case. Blix’s role would be important.”
835.
Mr Blair
and President Bush also discussed the need to push hard for peace
in the
Middle East
and dealing with WMD proliferation by countries beyond
Iraq.
836.
Mr Blair
suggested to Mr José Maria Aznar, the Spanish Prime
Minister,
that a second
resolution could be sought in late February, but not
earlier.
837.
Mr Blair
met Mr Aznar in Madrid on 30 January on his way to
Washington.275
The meeting
was followed by a press conference.
838.
Mr Blair
told Mr Aznar that he had told President Bush that a second
resolution
was
politically necessary for the UK. If the inspectors did not find
any WMD, the “next
best
outcome would be for Blix to establish through a second and third
report to the
Security
Council that Iraq was refusing full co‑operation”. The UK should
thereafter,
in early
March, seek a second resolution when, “assuming strong Blix
reports”, Mr Blair
judged
Russia would not object and France would need to choose whether to
veto.
Mr Blair
also suggested allowing time after a second resolution for Arab
countries
to try to
force Saddam Hussein into exile.
839.
Mr Blair
and Mr Aznar discussed the impact of a veto on the UN and,
therefore,
the need
to avoid one; and whether it would be better to seek a second
resolution in
mid‑ rather
than late February. Mr Blair argued that the situation could
not be allowed
to “drag
on, but it was important to give it a little longer”. He
acknowledged that public
275
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Meeting with Aznar, 30 January’.
153