Executive
Summary
9.
The following
are extracts from the main body of the Report covering some of
the
most
important issues considered by the Inquiry.
10.
After the
attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 and the fall of the Taliban
regime
in
Afghanistan in November, the US Administration turned its attention
to regime change
in Iraq as
part of the second phase of what it called the Global War on
Terror.
11.
The UK
Government sought to influence the decisions of the US
Administration and
avoid
unilateral US military action on Iraq by offering partnership to
the US and seeking
to build
international support for the position that Iraq was a threat with
which it was
necessary
to deal.
12.
In
Mr Blair’s view, the decision to stand “shoulder to shoulder”
with the US was an
essential
demonstration of solidarity with the UK’s principal ally as well as
being in the
UK’s
long‑term national interests.
13.
To do so
required the UK to reconcile its objective of disarming Iraq, if
possible
by peaceful
means, with the US goal of regime change. That was achieved by
the
development
of an ultimatum strategy threatening the use of force if Saddam
Hussein
did not
comply with the demands of the international community, and by
seeking to
persuade
the US to adopt that strategy and pursue it through the
UN.
14.
President
Bush’s decision, in September 2002, to challenge the UN to deal
with
Iraq, and
the subsequent successful negotiation of resolution 1441 giving
Iraq a final
opportunity
to comply with its disarmament obligations or face serious
consequences
if it did
not, was perceived to be a major success for Mr Blair’s
strategy and his influence
on President
Bush.
15.
But US
willingness to act through the UN was limited. Following the Iraqi
declaration
of 7
December 2002, the UK perceived that President Bush had decided
that the US
would take
military action in early 2003 if Saddam Hussein had not been
disarmed and
was still
in power.
16.
The timing of
military action was entirely driven by the US
Administration.
17.
At the end of
January 2003, Mr Blair accepted the US timetable for military
action
by mid‑March.
President Bush agreed to support a second resolution to help
Mr Blair.
18.
The UK
Government’s efforts to secure a second resolution faced
opposition
from those
countries, notably France, Germany and Russia, which believed that
the
inspections
process could continue. The inspectors reported that Iraqi
co‑operation,
while far
from perfect, was improving.
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