The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

substantial operation designed to achieve this (indeed, he has asked for the views

of the Attorney General on a UK-prepared plan to attack 21 targets). He accepts the

military advice that only by conducting such an operation, including against targets

north of the 33rd parallel, can we expect to reduce the threat substantially in the

medium term. But he accepts that, just as in the US, time will be required to afford

collective consideration of such a proposal. He believes that this is an issue to which

we will need to return in the future.

“In the meantime, he is clear that the status quo is not an option, and that a robust

return to the existing agreed concept of operations is essential … to enable the

coalition to manage the enhanced risk in the immediate term.”

346. Mr Patey reported on 3 August that the US had decided not to carry out the

proposed operation, pending consideration of its wider implications.189 He described it as

“welcome news”.

347. The MOD proposed to return to the level of operations within the NFZs before the

constraints imposed following the February attack. That would raise the profile of the

NFZs, but the FCO believed that the UK should be able to portray that as a legitimate

and proportionate response to the increased threat to air crew.

348. Mr Straw’s Private Office wrote to No.10 later that day, acknowledging the increase

in the threat and that military commanders should use their delegated authority to take

actions within the NFZs to minimise the risk to air crews.190 Mr Straw was concerned that

a major attack should not be initiated:

“… without considering carefully the implications for our wider interests.

“… A more substantial operation … would bring into stark relief arguments about

double standards and inflame Arab public opinion. We might face attacks on UK …

Embassies and other interests in the region. We owe a duty of care to our staff and

to British citizens in the region, as well as to our aircrews.

“Politically, a major operation north of the southern NFZ would play straight into

Saddam’s hands … UK domestic and international reaction following the February

attacks was hostile …

“Such an operation could also prove fatal to our current Iraq policy … a major

operation would be interpreted as a get-tough policy by the US in frustration at the

failure to get our revised sanctions approach agreed … The collapse of our current

policy, which has been carefully considered and agreed in Whitehall and with the

US, would leave us in a policy vacuum in which we would risk getting sucked into

adopting a more militaristic posture.

189 Minute Patey to PS [FCO], 3 August 2001, ‘Iraq: NFZs’.

190 Letter Sedwill to Tatham, 3 August 2001, ‘Iraq: RO4’.

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