The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
848.
Mr Blair
stated that it would only take Saddam Hussein “a year or two” to
acquire
a usable
nuclear weapon “if he were able to purchase fissile material
illegally”, rather
than the
fuller and more cautious assessment in the dossier (page 27) that
Iraq would
need
“essential components from foreign sources” to produce a warhead as
well as
fissile
material.
849.
Neither the
dossier nor Mr Blair addressed the likelihood of Iraq being
able to
procure
both fissile material and other essential components.
850.
Mr Blair
did not refer to the judgement in the dossier, which reflected the
JIC
Assessments
on the issue, that “while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not
be able
to produce
a nuclear weapon”.447
“If”, and
only if, sanctions were removed or proved
ineffective,
Iraq would then need “at least five years to produce sufficient
fissile material
for a
weapon”.
851.
Mr Blair
also stated that Iraq’s ballistic missile programme was “required
for
the
delivery of chemical, biological and nuclear programmes” and that
it was “clear
that a
significant number of longer-range missiles were effectively
concealed from the
previous
inspectors and remain, including up to 20 extended-range SCUD
missiles”.
Subsequently,
he added that the ballistic missile capability was “being developed
for
multi-purpose
use, including with WMD warheads”.
852.
This material
was in the draft of 23 September.
853.
The dossier
(pages 22-23) stated that Iraq had a “variety of delivery
means
available
for both chemical and biological agents”. It made no statement
about the
delivery of
nuclear weapons.
854.
The dossier
did not include the reference in the JIC Assessment of 9
September
2002 to an
intelligence report that:
“… suggests
Iraq has ‘lost’ the capability to develop warheads capable of
effectively
disseminating
chemical and biological agent and that it would take six months
to
overcome
the ‘technical difficulties’.”448
855.
There was no
mention in the dossier of concealment of longer-range
missiles,
other than
Iraq’s retention of “up to 20 Al Hussein missiles”.449
447
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
27.
448
JIC
Assessment, 9 September 2002, ‘Iraqi Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons –
Possible Scenarios’.
449
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
28.
278