The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

333.  The Chiefs of Staff discussed Maj Gen Fry’s paper on 12 February.160 They

observed that there would be a substantial requirement for other countries to share

the burden. The FCO undertook to explore the issue.

334.  General Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, questioned whether the

potential role for the ARRC was for the UK AO or all of Iraq, and whether it was to

be used in its NATO or national role.

335.  The potential deployment of the ARRC is addressed in Section 6.2.

336.  MOD officials briefed Ms Short on the military campaign on 12 February.

337.  On 12 February, MOD officials explained to Ms Short the general shape of the

campaign, the policy on targeting and the approach to post-conflict operations.161 The

record stated she was: “reassured that MOD was ‘catching up with the reality’ … that

humanitarian operations need to be an integral part of … campaign planning”, but

“reiterated in the strongest possible terms” her belief that the practical benefits of a

second resolution were worth a delay until the autumn. Ms Short’s main interest was

mitigation of the impact of conflict on the Iraqi people, including in the event of CBW use.

Working with the military in any UK Area of Responsibility (AOR), she wanted the UK to

set “a benchmark standard for recovery and reconstruction”.

338.  Briefing for Mr Hoon’s discussion of post-conflict issues with Dr Rice on

12 February listed eight “Key Gaps/US-UK policy differences”, including the role

of the UN, de-Ba’athification, SSR and economic policy.

339.  Mr Hoon discussed post-conflict issues with Dr Rice and Secretary Rumsfeld

in Washington on 12 February.

340.  Briefing prepared by the MOD Iraq Secretariat stated that US aftermath planning

was “impressive on details”, but “riddled with holes at the political and strategic levels”.162

With the US divided on the merits of involving the UN, the key issue was the legal basis

for any continuing occupation of Iraq. The UK assessment was that a specific mandate

was needed. Without that the Coalition would “face both obligations and constraints

which will face us with a choice between illegality and ineffectiveness”.

341.  The briefing listed eight “Key Gaps/US-UK policy differences” on post-conflict

planning:

• UN mandate.

• Transitional administration. The UK wanted to see transition to a UN-led civilian

administration as soon as possible.

160 Minutes, 12 February 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

161 Minute Lee to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 13 February 2003, ‘Briefing for International Development

Secretary’.

162 Minute Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 10 February 2003, ‘Secretary of State’s Visit to

Washington: Iraq’.

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