3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
632.
In Lord
Goldsmith’s view, the “draft would not be sufficient to authorise
the use
of force
without a second resolution”. He had made that clear the previous
day to
Mr Powell,
who had suggested that he should speak to the Prime
Minister.
633.
Discussing the
detail of the draft, Lord Goldsmith reiterated that he was
“very
troubled by
the way things appeared to be going”.
634.
Ms Adams
reported that Mr Straw had “explained the political
dimension”, his
conviction
that the “strategy of standing shoulder to shoulder with the US was
right
politically”,
and the importance of obtaining a “decent Security Council
resolution”.
Mr Blair
had said that the UK would act in accordance with international
law:
“That
remained the position. The consequences of acting unlawfully were
clearly
unacceptable.
But it was important not to suggest publicly that we had
doubts
about the
proposed resolution. It would make the prospects of reaching
agreement
remote.”
635.
Mr Straw
told Lord Goldsmith that he had made Lord Goldsmith’s views on
the
legal
position clear to Mr Blair.
636.
Lord Goldsmith
responded that he understood the politics and the
importance
of getting
President Bush “behind” a UN resolution. He was:
“… not
concerned about what Ministers said externally, up to a point.
The
Government
must, however, not fall into the trap of believing it was in a
position to
take action
which it could not take. Nor must HMG promise the US Government
that
it can do
things which the Attorney considers to be unlawful.”
637.
Ms Adams
recorded that Mr Straw commented that he believed Secretary
Powell
“understood
the legal position”.
638.
Recalling his
advice to Mr Blair of 30 July, Lord Goldsmith told
Mr Straw that he
might “now
need to send a further note”. Lord Goldsmith:
“…
recognised that circumstances may change, but he wished to make
clear to
the Foreign
Secretary that his firm view was that if a resolution was adopted
in the
terms of
the present US draft, and if Blix subsequently reported to the
Council that
there had
been a breach by Iraq, the resolution as it stands would not be
sufficient to
authorise
the use of force without another Security Council
resolution.”
639.
Mr Straw
was recorded as suggesting that Lord Goldsmith might:
“… not wish
to commit himself on paper until he had seen the Prime Minister.
There
might be
circumstances, for example, if Russia vetoed a second resolution in
the
face of
clear evidence that Iraq was flouting the Council’s demands, in
which force
would be
justified on the basis of existing resolutions. The French had
indicated that
they would
support such an interpretation.”
313