9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
The MOD
proposed to consolidate MNF at a single operating base at Basra Air
Station
by the end
of May. That would enable UK forces to:
•
deliver
enhanced Iraqi Army training through enlarged military training
teams
and a
dedicated Joint Leadership Academy;
•
improve
support to the rule of law through concentrated work with the
Iraqi
police in
areas such as forensics and continued mentoring at the Provincial
Joint
Co‑ordination
Centre (see Section 12.1);
•
maintain a
dedicated force reserve to ensure that they could react to events
and
support
Iraqi security operations if required;
•
reduce MNF
vulnerability and exposure to attack, particularly indirect fire;
and
•
improve
co‑ordination with the UK civilian effort in MND(SE), much of which
had
been
relocated to the Air Station in October 2006.
411.
DOP(I)
recognised that final decisions could not be made until after
Mr Browne had
discussed
the proposals in greater detail with Secretary
Gates.222
There was
concern
that the US
appeared to be adopting a “more purist approach” to the criteria to
be met
before
transition to PIC and that this was likely to delay transition in
Maysan.
412.
The IPU wrote
a paper proposing an engagement strategy regarding the
UK’s
future
presence in Southern Iraq focused on the need for careful handling
of others
affected by
the proposed relocation to the Air Station, for the same meeting of
DOP(I).223
413.
The paper said
that civilian staff, including from the US State Department and
the
UN
Development Programme, had been based in Basra Palace, but the FCO
believed
that all
were content to relocate to Basra Air Station.
414.
The IPU
advised that it should be made clear that there was “no separate
UK
agenda in
the South” and that there had been no unilateral decision‑making by
the UK.
415.
The paper
suggested that key messages to reinforce with US
interlocutors
included:
“•
There is no
separate UK agenda in the South. We have not taken any
unilateral
UK
decisions, nor will we. We are part of the coalition and will
continue to act as
such. What
we plan in the South is part of the MNF Transition Bridging
Strategy.
•
We remain
committed to delivering the agreed conditions in Maysan &
Basra,
to enable
transition to happen on the agreed schedule. We are not arguing
for
ditching
the conditions‑based approach.
…
•
The
handover of Basra will not mean withdrawal of UK troops from
southern
Iraq. We
have made very clear publicly that we intend to retain
significant
222
Minutes, 11
January 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
223
Paper IPU,
8 January 2007, ‘Future UK Presence in Southern Iraq: Engagement
Strategy’.
77