The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

1076. Maj Gen Cross told the Inquiry:

“He [Mr Blair] was engaged … So we had a very sensible conversation, and at the

end of it I do remember saying, in so many words, I have no doubt at all we will win

this military campaign. I do not believe that we are ready for post-war Iraq …

“He nodded and didn’t say anything particularly. But I’m sure he understood what

I was saying.”459

1077. In his written statement, Maj Gen Cross explained that:

“… after all of the many briefings and conversations I had in the UK at that time, my

sense was that:

• Not everyone believed that there would actually be a war; if there was to be one,

then there was certainly no consensus that we (the UK) should be involved;

• There was no coherent UK, pan-Whitehall, view of what post-war Iraq should

look like;

• There was serious reluctance to take on the US over their views;

• If events did unfurl differently to ‘the plan’ – such as it was – there was an

underlying belief that the US would quickly be able to bring whatever was

necessary to bear;

• There was, therefore, some seriously wishful and woolly, and un-joined up,

thinking going on!”460

1078. Maj Gen Cross told the Inquiry he had found no single cross-Whitehall

perspective on events and that it took some time to get agreement that he should

go to Kuwait:

“At this stage it is very, very late in the day to be deciding whether or not we are

going to be engaged in these post-war operations. So I felt very isolated is the

truth.”461

1079. Mr Straw discussed the “military feel” of ORHA with Secretary Powell on

19 March.

1080. On 14 March, Mr Ehrman had raised the need to “civilianise” ORHA with

Mr Straw. There were three FCO personnel there, but only one representative of the

State Department.462 ORHA would provide the initial civilian government of Iraq and it

was strongly in the UK’s interests to increase the size of the civilian contingent within

it. He hoped that Mr Straw would raise the issue with Secretary Powell when they

next spoke.

459 Public hearing, 7 December 2009, page 34.

460 Statement, 2009, page 16.

461 Public hearing, 7 December 2009, page 31.

462 Minute Ehrman to Private Secretary [FCO], 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Military Aspects and Day After’.

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