3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
118.
Mr Peter
Watkins, Principal Private Secretary to Mr Geoff Hoon, the
Defence
Secretary,
wrote to Sir David Manning on 20 September, advising that two
issues
needed
quickly to be addressed:
•
what
potential UK force contribution should be presented to a US
planning
conference
the following week; and
•
whether to
replace army units already allocated to Operation FRESCO, the
plan
for the
Armed Forces to provide cover in the event of a firefighters’
strike, so that
they would
be available if a land force contribution was
approved.35
119.
The MOD
proposed that the air and maritime package, with Special
Forces
(Package
2), should be presented as a potential UK contribution at the US
Central
Command
(CENTCOM) planning conference; and that further work was under way
on
whether the
UK might also offer a Commando Group of around 1,700 Royal Marines
for
early
operations in southern Iraq, although further work would be needed
to establish
whether
that could be sustained in parallel with ground operations in
northern Iraq.
120.
The MOD had
also considered the provision of a divisional
headquarters
together
with an armoured brigade to operate with the US (Package 3). That
would
be “more
complicated”, but the Chiefs of Staff regarded it as the “minimum
sensible”
ground
contribution to operations in the North. It would entail a
commitment of around
28,000 service
personnel in addition to the 13,000 in Package 2, and the call‑out
of
around
6,000 reservists.
121.
Mr Watkins
told Sir David that Mr Hoon felt it would be “premature” to
offer
a ground
contribution on the same basis as Package 2:
“… we
should indicate to CENTCOM that we are still considering this
option and that
they should
model two plans in parallel, one including the UK land force
contribution
and one
without it.”
122.
Mr Blair
and Sir David Manning had reservations about the viability and
costs
of the MOD
proposal.
123.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair that:
“The
possibility that the military could make a land contribution in the
North is
a surprise.
Until recently we were being told that covering the firemen’s
strike
(Operation
FRESCO) would make this impossible. Now, suddenly it isn’t.
The
(militarily
mouth‑watering) prospect of being given tactical leadership of
the
campaign in
the North … may have something to do with this volte
face.”36
35
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 20 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Potential UK
Contribution to Any Military Action’.
36
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 22 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Possible UK
Military Contribution’.
219