12.1 | Security Sector Reform

On 11 May 2005, the JIC assessed:

“Iraqi intelligence organisations will be critical for success: they are developing but

are still largely unproductive and unco‑ordinated … Provincial and local structures are

also emerging. A number of these are under the control of rival militias and political

groups; some are Iranian financed. The degree to which these organisations are

able – or willing – to be absorbed into a national structure is unclear. The tensions

between the Ministers of Defence and Interior, and the addition of a new Ministry of

State for National Security, will complicate the issue.”695

On 12 October, the JIC assessed:

“Some progress has been made, including establishing central co‑ordinating

mechanisms … There is some co‑ordination between INIS and DGIS, but overall

co‑ordination remains poor. INIS is perceived by local politicians as run by the CIA;

DGIS is making some progress but is undeveloped and under‑resourced; and the

MOI’s relationship with other agencies remains difficult …”696

On 6 September 2007, a report from the Independent Commission on the Security Forces

in Iraq stated:

“The level of information sharing and cooperation between the Iraqi intelligence

community and the Iraqi Security Forces is not satisfactory – a problem

exacerbated by bureaucratic competition and distrust among duplicative intelligence

organisations.” 697

The report advocated low technology solutions, describing Iraq as “principally a human

intelligence theatre of operations” and commended the TIPS hotline set up by UK police

officers (see Box, ‘TIPS hotline’, earlier in this Section).

748. On 21 July 2005, Mr Naworynsky forwarded to Mr Quarrey an update from

Lieutenant General Robin Brims, now SBMR‑I, on the ISF’s progress.698 Lt Gen Brims

wrote:

• The Iraqi Army was “steadily building in confidence and competence” though

units “were not yet able to conduct complex operations”.

• The IPS was “lagging the Iraqi Army”. Personnel were “of a doubtful quality” but

plans were being implemented “to address these shortcomings”. The “broad

judgement” was that the IPS would “not fail when Multinational Forces step

back, but we may be uneasy about their methods”.

• The IMOD was “immature and struggling with implementation of its policies”.

695 JIC Assessment, 11 May 2005, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces’.

696 JIC Assessment, 12 October 2005, ‘The Iraqi Security Forces: Very Slow Progress’.

697 Report, 6 September 2007, ‘Independent Commission on the Security Forces in Iraq’.

698 Letter Naworynsky to Quarrey, 21 July 2005, ‘Update on Progress of Iraqi Security Forces’ attaching

Paper 20 July 2005, ‘Update on Progress of Iraqi Security Forces’.

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