The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“There are
indications that regime cohesion is under increasing pressure, but
no
sign that
it will collapse before military action begins. Reporting suggests
desertion
rates are
rising in the Republican Guard (RG), up to some 20 percent. One
report
also
indicates that members of the RG are waiting for an attack to begin
before
escaping.
Media reporting shows small numbers of Iraqi soldiers already
offering to
surrender.
The regime proved able, however, to restore stability rapidly after
limited
anti-regime
protests in mid-March.”
675.
The JIC
assessed that Saddam Hussein was focusing on the defence of
Baghdad:
“Imagery
indicates elements of the Special Republican Guard (SRG) have
been
deployed
near to Saddam International airport and SRG security units have
been
dispersed
in central Baghdad. One report indicated SRG had also been
deployed
in the
northern outskirts of Baghdad in the direction of Tikrit. Imagery
indicates
Republican
Guard units deploying to the South, West and East 30km outside
the
capital,
apparently to concealment sites for protection against air
strikes.”
676.
The JIC judged
that Iraq had “a useable CBW capability, deliverable using
artillery,
missiles
and possibly unmanned aerial vehicles”. While a report in mid-March
had
indicated
that Iraq’s chemical weapons had not been assembled, there was
intelligence
to suggest
that Iraq planned to use them. Reporting also suggested that Iraq
could try
to blame
civilian deaths resulting from CBW use on the
Coalition.
•
“Intelligence
on the timing of CBW use is inconsistent […].”
•
Intelligence
on the deployment of CBW was “sparse”.
•
“Uncorroborated
reporting” suggested the “delivery of CW shells to
Republican
Guard units
… south of Baghdad”.
•
There was
“no evidence” that ballistic missiles destroyed by Coalition air
action
in February
“were equipped with CBW warheads”, but the JIC could not be
sure
that it
“would receive indications prior to an attack”.
•
Saddam
Hussein retained “ultimate control of CBW use”, but there
were
suggestions
that he had “contingency plans to devolve military
decision
making,
including CBW, to regional commands, if communications are cut
with
Baghdad”.
•
Saddam
Hussein “might take this decision early, once the severity of the
initial
attack
becomes clear or in the face of Kurdish or Shia uprisings”,
although the
possibility
of Saddam offering concessions to remain in power “would
argue
against
pre-emptive attacks and devolving control”.
•
An “early
strategic U-turn, once Saddam realises the intensity of the attack
…
and the
risk of losing control of his CBW capability” could not be ruled
out, and
he might
“then order early CBW attacks”.
494