3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
336.
Sir Christopher
wrote:
•
A military
invasion and its aftermath would be “less perilous [for the
US]
in company”.
•
President
Bush’s initiative (his letter to Congress of 4 September) had “got
him
off the
defensive” but he had “been damaged by policy drift”. Iraq was
“likely to
dominate
Washington politics until Congress adjourns for the mid‑term
elections
[in
November 2002]”.
•
President
Bush had repeated comments that the policy was Saddam
Hussein’s
removal:
“Disarmament as [an] objective has been left to lesser spokesmen
to
articulate.”
•
President
Bush’s instincts “were with the hawks”: Saddam Hussein had “had
his
chance” and
would “never change”. The elimination of WMD was
“inseparable
from the
elimination of Saddam himself; inspections were a
discredited
instrument”
and the UN “was not to be trusted”.
•
Mr Blair
was “likely to find a President with his heart and his head in
conflict”.
While
President Bush’s instincts might be to “move to attack Iraq as soon
as
possible”,
now that he had “launched a process of consultation” he would “to
a
degree be
bound by its dynamic”. The challenge for the President would be
how
to convince
Congress and the American people “why it is urgent” to get rid
of
Saddam
Hussein.
•
Hearings in
Congress could last “through October”. There was a “huge
debate
inside the
Administration about the content of Security Council resolution(s)
…
even the
principle of a SCR remains under challenge. I am reluctant to
predict
how this
will be decided … before the Prime Minister arrives.”
•
The
“dilemma … over inspections” was “sharp”: “Many Americans want to
set
the bar so
high that if Saddam were to accept, it would be tantamount to
regime
change. I
assume this is unsaleable in New York. For others … the nightmare
is
that Saddam
will say ‘yes’ and avoid attack. I think it is far from a given …
that
the UN
process should be exhausted, as we would understand it, before
military
action is
contemplated. The UK could find itself in an awkward two‑way
stretch
between the
Americans and others in the Security Council.”
•
The White
House hoped that the UN approach would “square the circle
of
divisions
within the Administration”. Sir Christopher commented that it
might
succeed but
it was “as likely to reopen the fault line between [Secretary]
Powell
and the neo
cons and by extension between the two sides of the
Atlantic”.
•
“The
pre‑conditions for military action are a focal point for Camp
David. So are
post‑war
Iraq and the MEPP … The President seems to have bought the
neo
con notion
that with the overthrow of Saddam all will be sweetness and light
in
Iraq, with
automatic benefits in the rest of the Middle East (which partly
explains
his
inactivity on the latter). In reality, it will probably make
pacifying Afghanistan
look like
child’s play. The US is probably in greater need of coalition and
UN
153