The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

45. Secretary Powell gave a long and detailed presentation to the Security Council

on 5 February setting out the US position on the threat posed by Iraq and its

failure to comply with resolution 1441.

46. President Bush wrote in his memoir that he had agreed to pursue a second

resolution if Mr Blair wanted one at their meeting in Washington on 31 January; and

that “the best way to get a second resolution was to lay out the evidence”.15 He asked

Secretary Powell to make a presentation to the UN:

“He had credibility as a highly respected diplomat known to be reluctant about the

possibility of war. I knew he would do a thorough, a careful job. In early February,

Colin spent four days and nights at the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] personally

reviewing the intelligence to ensure he was comfortable with every word in

his speech.”

47. In his presentation to the Security Council on 5 February, Secretary Powell stated

that he had asked for the meeting for two purposes:

• The first was to support the “core assessments” made by Dr Blix and

Dr ElBaradei on 27 January that:

{{“… Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even

today – of the disarmament that was demanded of it”; and

{{“… did not provide any new information relevant to certain questions that

have been outstanding since 1998”.

• The second was to provide “additional information and to share … what the

United States knows about Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, as well [as]

Iraq’s involvement in terrorism”.16

48. Secretary Powell stated that the information, “when combined with what all of us

have learned over the years,” was “deeply troubling”. There was “an accumulation of

facts and disturbing patterns of behaviour” that demonstrated that Saddam Hussein and

his regime had “made no effort to disarm as required by the international community”

and was “concealing their efforts to produce more weapons”.

49. Secretary Powell provided tapes of intercepted conversations and satellite imagery

which he interpreted as demonstrating Iraq’s attempts to conceal activity to “clean up”

facilities before visits by the inspectors.

15 Bush GW. Decision Points. Virgin Books, 2010.

16 UN Security Council, ‘4701st Meeting Wednesday 5 February 2003’ (S/PV.4701).

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