12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
318.
Former DCC
Brand told the Inquiry:
“Trying to
persuade my military colleagues at two‑star and three‑star level
that this
was a
long‑term investment of restructuring the police seemed to work
against their
sort of
short‑term mission goals, and I very vividly remember the
presentation that
was done to
the Commanding General which was entitled ‘30,000 in 30 Days’
…
I had to
say ‘Okay, in that case then, why don’t you give me the military to
train?
I have
read a few war books, I have seen a few war films, it can’t be as
difficult as
that, or is
that as ridiculous as what you are suggesting, which is we recruit
30,000 in
30 days,
call them police, label them police, give them weapons and say ‘You
are
now in the
police’ but actually have no capability to do the things that
policemen
319.
CC Kernaghan
visited Iraq for the second time in mid‑November
2003.284
His
visit
was
affected by a “security ‘lockdown’” which meant he was unable to
travel into Basra
and so met
Sir Hilary Synnott in Basra Airport.285
320.
In his report
to the Home and Foreign Secretaries, CC Kernaghan
commented:
“… the ‘bad
luck’ factor has kicked in with a vengeance … The security
situation is
not good
and will become worse, but the answer to many aspects of the
problem
is an
effective Iraqi security infrastructure … It is quite clear that
the current level of
UK police
assistance is unsustainable in that it is insufficient to deliver a
coherent
package of
support and I suggest that the UK Government has to decide to
either
increase
our assistance or withdraw our support altogether.”286
321.
CC Kernaghan
stated that he “detected the lack of a clear vision” for
policing
within Iraq
and was concerned that a “hybrid US City department/UK police
service”
was being created.
He commented that he was “unclear as to the overall CPA
Iraq
‘model’ and
whether or not a single tier national service is being created”. CC
Kernaghan
also
reported that senior officials were “reluctant to be definitive as
to the CP[A]’s
strategic
plan” because “meetings in Washington (and London) might well
totally change
existing
plans”.
283
Public
hearing, 29 June 2010, pages 24‑25.
284
Report
Kernaghan to Straw, 18 November 2003, ‘Report on Second Visit to
Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan –
11/11/03 – 14/11/03’.
285
Public
hearing Synnott, Lamb and Stewart, 9 December 2009, page
21.
286
Report
Kernaghan to Straw, 18 November 2003, ‘Report on Second Visit to
Iraq by Chief Constable
Kernaghan –
11/11/03 – 14/11/03’.
129