12.2 |
Conclusions: Security Sector Reform
99.
During the
summer of 2005, there is evidence that UK officials were not
clear
about their
departments’ role within the SSR effort and felt disconnected from
what was
happening
on the ground. That was exemplified in June when DFID
commissioned
a
consultant to assist the FCO in drawing together a cross‑Whitehall
strategy for UK
support to
the development of Iraqi policing capacity. The FCO, the MOD and
DFID
struggled
to reach an agreement on what the strategy should say and
acknowledged
they simply
did not know whether policing was on track or not.
100.
Lieutenant
General Robin Brims, SBMR‑I, reported in July that, although the
Iraqi
Army was
steadily increasing in confidence, it did not yet have the ability
to conduct
complex
operations. The police were lagging behind the army and were of
doubtful
quality but
plans were in place to address that.
101.
Mr Blair
saw Lt Gen Brims’ report and sought an honest assessment of
the
progress of
Iraqiisation, which suggests a lack of confidence in the MOD’s
reporting.
Dr John
Reid, the Defence Secretary, admitted that there was still a focus
on quantity
rather than
quality in stating “numerically, generation of ISF remains on
track, but
significant
development in key capability areas is still
needed”.57
102.
The
information on ISF numbers also masked other issues. In September,
an
FCO
transition plan for the IPS showed, when compared with earlier MOD
papers, that
the overall
figure of 55 percent of police trained masked considerable
variations across
MND(SE) –
although 90 percent of personnel in Dhi Qar province had received
training,
the figures
for Muthanna and Basra were considerably lower (40 percent and 42
percent
respectively).
103.
Mr Blair
expressed his concerns about ISF capability, following reports of
police
involvement
in attacks on the Multi‑National Forces in Basra. But despite
concerns that
had been
expressed about the capacity of the ISF, Dr Reid recommended a
reduction in
UK forces
should take place in October or November of 2005.
104.
A few days
after Dr Reid made his recommendation the Jameat incident in
Basra
on 19
September raised questions about the ISF in MND(SE). Officials from
the FCO,
the MOD and
DFID judged that the incident had highlighted the risks to
achieving UK
objectives
in MND(SE), and that those risks had implications for military
resources.
Nevertheless,
assumptions about ISF readiness were not re‑examined by
Ministers.
Reluctance
to consider the potential implications of the Jameat incident
obscured what
it had
revealed about the security situation in MND(SE).
105.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser, wrote: “It is
clear that we
need to
review whether our police training strategy in the
South‑East is working, and
whether the
national policing strategy knits together.”58
Sir Nigel
reported that Mr Blair
had agreed
that Sir Ronnie Flanagan, Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of
Constabulary,
57
Minute Reid
to Blair, 28 August 2005, ‘Update on progress of the Iraqi security
forces (ISF)’.
58
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 4 October 2005, ‘Iraq Strategy’.
433