The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Amin
thanked the UK for its continued support of his Ministry,
especially the training for
prison
inspectors in Basra, and asked Mr Hood to investigate whether
additional funding
might be
available to extend the training to all inspectors.
The
telegram reported that security concerns had prevented the
International Committee
of the Red
Cross (ICRC) carrying out “all but a few” inspections of detention
facilities and
the
Minister of Justice was reticent to appoint an independent prison
ombudsman. That
meant there
was “an even greater need” to support the training of Iraqi
officials to carry
out
inspections.
678.
A telegram
from Mr Chaplin on 21 January 2005 reported that the retired
US
General
Gary Luck had left Iraq on 20 January after a week‑long assessment
of the
ISF’s
development.619
Gen Luck
had been appointed by Secretary Rumsfeld to head
a
20‑strong
team “asked to validate” the Petraeus Plan and “examine whether
anything
could be
done to speed up the delivery of capable Iraqi
forces”.
679.
Gen Luck
would not be producing a written report but would
brief
Secretary Rumsfeld
and the President on his findings. Mr Chaplin understood
that
Gen Luck
would “broadly endorse the emerging MNF‑I plan for ISF development”
and:
•
suggest
departments other than Defense play a bigger role;
•
“rubber‑stamp
the MNF‑I’s intention to switch its main effort from operations
to
training
and mentoring” since that had worked well in MND(SE);
•
recommend
additional advisers in the Ministries to coach and mentor Iraqis;
and
•
recommend a
fundamental overhaul of intelligence structures.
680.
Mr Chaplin
also referred to the Police Advisory Teams (PATs) concept, whereby
a
small
number of MNF‑I soldiers and police advisers would be placed in IPS
stations. He
wrote that
there were different views on its viability. Iraqi advice was that
this would “be
a backward
step politically”, be resented by the IPS and “raise serious force
protection
issues” for
those involved. Gen Luck had indicated that he did not intend
to reflect any of
those
concerns to Secretary Rumsfeld, “presumably because [Gen]
Casey was dead set
on PATs,
which he sold heavily in Washington”. Mr Chaplin thought that
PATs had “now
got so much
momentum that it will go ahead in some format” but that the UK
“should
influence
the eventual shape it takes by encouraging MNF‑I to engage
seriously with the
Iraqi
concerns”.
681.
Mr Chaplin
wrote that Gen Luck was “particularly impressed” by the UK’s
policing
work in the
South and that he was “seriously thinking of recommending that the
UK
should take
the lead for all police work in Iraq”. Mr Chaplin thought that
“this would
probably be
a step too far for us, and possibly for the Americans as well”, but
that the
619
Telegram 58
Baghdad to FCO London, 21 January 2005, ‘Iraq: ISF Assessment Team
Visit’.
204