12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
571.
On 29 July,
Mr Chaplin wrote to the FCO in London advising that the UK
should
resist
making substantive changes to the draft Strategy which risked
delaying publication
and
“unravelling what we have achieved so far”.518
He
explained that the Strategy had
been
through “a laborious drafting process” for the past seven weeks and
the “latest
version
represents a fine balance between the IIG and US/UK
representatives”.
572.
Mr Chaplin
explained that some “confusion has crept into the Whitehall
debate
about
different elements of the overall strategy required to deal with
the insurgency”.
Seeking to
clarify matters, he wrote that the Strategy was “a conceptual
document
describing
the Government’s overall approach”. The operational work “falling
out”
of it included:
•
the MNF‑I
strategic campaign plan to develop a self‑reliant ISF by January
2006;
•
an
operational plan to man, train, equip and assist the ISF, currently
being
“masterminded
by Gen Petraeus”;
•
a baseline
“troops to task” reassessment; and
•
work on the
new intelligence architecture.
573.
By early
August, Mr Blair was concerned that neither an Iraqi security
strategy
nor an MNF
internal review of Iraqiisation had yet appeared.519
The
security strategy
was
particularly important for demonstrating publicly that the IIG had
a plan to deal with
the
security situation. The FCO was instructed to press Prime Minister
Allawi on the
importance
of issuing a public statement soon.
574.
Mr Dominic
Asquith, a Deputy Commissioner in the CPA, reported on 9 August
that
Dr Allawi
understood the need to explain the IIG strategy on security, “but
does not think
the
National Security Strategy document fits the bill”.520
Dr Allawi
had, however, agreed
the need to
sort out the details quickly with the MNF.
575.
On 14 August,
Mr Asquith reported that the launch of the National
Security
Strategy had
been the subject of a “confused discussion” at the MCNS on 12
August.521
Dr Allawi
had said that the Strategy would need to be revised but it was
unclear how
that would
be done.
576.
By the time
Mr Blair visited Iraq and met Dr Allawi in Baghdad on 21
December,
a new plan
had been drafted.522
They
discussed Iraqiisation. Mr Blair stated that he
had seen a
draft of Dr Allawi’s new security plan which he thought was
“along the right
lines” and
that he had agreed to review the Iraqiisation strategy with
President Bush
in January.
518
Telegram 78
Baghdad to FCO London, 29 July 2004, ‘Iraq: National Security
Strategy’.
519
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sawers, 6 August 2004,
‘Iraq’.
520
Telegram
107 Baghdad to FCO London, 9 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Security: Prime
Minister’s Views’.
521
Telegram
128 Baghdad to London, 14 August 2004, ‘Iraq: Ministerial Committee
on National Security
(MCNS), 12
August’.
522
Letter
Quarrey to Adams, 21 December 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to
Baghdad, 21 December:
Meeting
with Allawi’.
181