9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006

Departments, provide savings against the Reserve over the period of the

Helmand deployment.”

536. Lord Walker told the Inquiry:

“We were being asked can we do this, and we said, ‘Yes, we can do it and this is

the penalty we pay’ but none of those penalties were sufficient, I think, for us to say

‘Those are so grave that you should not do this.’ So we were giving them the advice,

which they were following. I don’t think we had any difficulty with that.”254

537. Lt Gen Fry told the Inquiry that, although some people argued that further

commitments should not be taken on until it was clear that the UK could draw down

significantly in Iraq, there were a lot of competing arguments, including “a view within

the British army that they could have more success in Afghanistan than they could

have in Iraq”.255

538. As planning for transition continued, Mr James Tansley, the British Consul General

in Basra, reported on 20 January that:

“There is some nervousness, particularly in US circles, that if the British military

leave Maysan then the border would become more porous to the smuggling of

weapons. But this argument pre-supposes that MND(SE) have control over the

border, which they do not (and nor realistically could they with current resources).

Their efforts have rather been on building capacity in the DBE [Department of Border

Enforcement], which is likely to continue post-election. There is also a less defined

concern about Iranian influence. But again it is difficult to see how military transition

would affect that.”256

539. Mr Tansley added:

“The situation … in Maysan and Muthanna underlines why PRTs in those provinces

are not required. Military transition will mean no international staff will be stationed

in Maysan and Muthanna, and travel there by them is likely to be only possible with

military escort (it would likely require a battle group).”

540. On 24 January, Gen Walker wrote to Lieutenant General David Richards,

Commander of the ARRC, to summarise the UK’s position.257 Gen Walker described:

“… the very tight capability and resource position that HMG and the British Armed

Forces currently face, with two concurrent medium scale operations in prospect

soon in Iraq (UK’s top foreign policy priority) and Afghanistan, together with a range

254 Public hearing, 1 February 2010, pages 57-58.

255 Public hearing, 16 December 2009, pages 96-97.

256 eGram 1266/06 Basra to FCO London, 20 January 2006, ‘Iraq: Military Transition in Maysan and

Muthanna’.

257 Letter Walker to Richards, 24 January 2006, [untitled].

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