1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
it had made
in weaponisation technologies before 1991 and the existence of
a
“cadre of experienced
personnel who were employed in the clandestine nuclear
programmes”,
Iraq had the “knowledge and the technical capability to exploit,
for
nuclear weapons
purposes, any relevant materials or technology to which it may
gain
access in
the future”.
535.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock, UK Permanent Representative to the UN in New
York
from July
1998 to 2003, told the Inquiry that in July/August 1998, the
Security Council
had
been:
“… close to
agreeing that Iraq was no longer pursuing nuclear weapons
capability,
but the
United States blocked a certification of that status because Saddam
Hussein
had not
fulfilled absolutely all the detailed requirements. The chemical,
biological
and missile
development files were left open.”215
536.
The
Strategic
Defence Review, published in
July 1998, stated that “Saddam
Hussein’s
Iraq” represented a “continuing threat”; and that:
“The size
of the military forces available and the presence and potential
spread of
ballistic
missiles, chemical and biological weapons and even nuclear weapons
add
to the
risks. These dangers seem unlikely to diminish and may
grow.”216
537.
On
30 July, the Iraqi leadership made a statement which set out
concerns about
the
deliberations on the “nuclear file” currently under way in the
Security Council, “the
arbitrary
and aggressive position” of the US, and the “failure of the
Security Council to
adopt a
fair and equitable resolution”.217
538.
The statement
concluded that, “As a result of the way in which the nuclear
file
has been
dealt with … and of the manoeuvres of the Special Commission”, Iraq
faced
the
prospect of the embargo continuing for “an unknown and unspecified
period”
and the
Special Commission continuing to “destroy and squander” the
property of
Iraq. Iraq
had agreed arrangements for access to Presidential sites with the
UN
Secretary‑General
with the objective of awakening “the conscience of the
Security
Council and the international
community regarding the facts”, and that it would lead
to the
lifting of the embargo. But there had not been “any perceptible
result”.
539.
The statement
declared Iraq’s intention to “call for a comprehensive
national
debate …
and on the position that should be adopted” in the near future; and
that the
forthcoming
meeting with the Special Commission would be “an essential
indication”
of its
attitude.
215
Statement,
November 2009, page 1.
216
Ministry of
Defence, Strategic
Defence Review, July
1998.
217
UN Security
Council, 30 July 1998, ‘Letter dated 30 July 1998 from
the Permanent Representative of
Iraq to the
United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’
(S/1998/703).
121