The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
194.
From March
until mid-May 2003, Intelligence Updates on Iraq were produced on
a
195.
The Updates
were used “to sweep up and summarise recent intelligence”
and
included
“explanatory comments”; but they were “not a vehicle for
assessment”.115
196.
On 26 June
2002, Mr Webb informed Mr Hoon’s Private Office that MOD
officials
were
encouraging the Cabinet Office to supplement the Pigott Group (an
MOD-led,
inter‑departmental
group of senior officials – see Section 6.4) with a broader
body
involving a
wider range of departments with a policy interest in Iraq and the
region.116
197.
Those ideas
began to take shape on 8 August, when Mr Jim Drummond,
Assistant
Head of OD Sec, informed Mr McKane that he had spoken to Sir
David
Manning
about possible changes to Whitehall structures.117
Mr Drummond
explained
that one
consequence of existing Whitehall mechanisms for discussing Iraq,
including
in
particular the Pigott Group’s focus on military matters, was that
“we are focusing
a lot on
military aspects and less on the alliance building, morning after,
unintended
consequences
etc. Come September there may be a case for a tighter grip
from
the Centre.”
198.
Mr Drummond
raised the issue with Sir David Manning again on 30 August.
He
recalled
that Sir David had commented earlier in the summer that it was too
soon to
think about
management of the unintended consequences of conflict, but that the
issue
would
probably need to be discussed in the autumn.118
199.
Mr Drummond
enclosed a “skeleton” paper on the subject prepared by a
Cabinet
Office
junior official and suggested meeting to discuss the paper and
Whitehall
machinery
for Iraq at the same time.
200.
The Cabinet
Office paper on unintended consequences focused on the
possible
impact of war on UK interests and on countries in the region,
rather than on
post‑conflict Iraq.
201.
The FCO
produced a more substantial paper on the unintended consequences
of
conflict
for the region and beyond on 20 September (see Section
6.4).
114
Public
hearing, 8 December 2009, page 7.
115
Minute
Miller to Manning, 21 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Intelligence
Updates’.
116
Minute Webb
to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 26 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.
117
Minute
Drummond to McKane, 8 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
118
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 30 August 2002, ‘Iraq: Unintended
Consequences’ attaching Note
Cabinet
Office, 30 August 2002, ‘Outline of a Paper: Iraq: Managing the
Unintended Consequences’ and
Paper
Cabinet Office, 28 August 2002, ‘Unintended Consequences of War on
Iraq: Skeleton of Paper’.
298