9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

593. On 27 November, Mr Straw told Cabinet that during his visit to Iraq he had

been struck that the change to the political timetable had had a dramatic impact on

the CPA and the GC, “New urgency had been imparted to both the political and

security tracks.”331

594. On 27 November, Mr Sawers commented to Mr Straw’s Private Secretary that:

“… the ARRC is a high quality asset which, in these times of heavy demands on

the security front, we should be looking to deploy … Holding it back for the perfect

task risks leaving it with nothing to do for far too long. The question is: Iraq or

Afghanistan.”332

595. Mr Sawers went on to observe that “Iraq is the higher political priority for HMG”, but

that there was a risk that deploying the ARRC to Iraq would either create complications

with US troops and a dual chain of command or encourage the US to withdraw its troops

prematurely. By contrast, Afghanistan was seen as a more immediate priority. Mr Sawers

concluded that he inclined towards recommending the deployment of the ARRC to Iraq –

the “greater strategic and political importance of the Iraq to the UK tips the balance”.

Mr Sawers recommended that, as the forthcoming NATO Summit at Istanbul coincided

with the planned transfer of sovereignty in Iraq, it might be an opportune moment to

announce any decision to deploy the ARRC to Iraq.

Since May 2003, the CPA had been operating on the assumption that it would be

responsible for the administration and reconstruction of Iraq until at least December 2004.

CPA programmes and spending plans had been based on that assumption.

Mr Bearpark told the Inquiry:

“Once you know that your tenure is only going to be six months, even the most naïve

planners knew that the objectives they had set were not going to be achieved within

that period.”333

Sir Hilary Synnott told the Inquiry that the idea of an early transfer to a transitional Iraqi

government came as a surprise to him:

“In the middle of November, much to our surprise, and in many – well, in some

senses disappointment, it was decided that the CPA should wind up at the end of

June, and I was due to leave – the six months would have been the end of January. It

became clear to me a couple of months before that that the entire focus of Baghdad’s

attention had shifted from trying to make something work into, ‘What are we going to

do to run down?’”334

Detail on the consequences for reconstruction activity can be found in Section 10.1.

331 Cabinet Conclusions, 27 November 2003.

332 Minute Sawers to Private Secretary [FCO], 27 November 2003, ‘Deployment of the ARRC’.

333 Public hearing, 6 July 2010, page 44.

334 Public hearing, 9 December 2009, page 47.

305