The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
accountable? …
At a tactical level, UK forces will need guidance on how to
treat
various
wings of the Iraqi security infrastructure as they are encountered
in country.”
68.
On 11
February, Mr Mike O’Brien, FCO Minister of State for the
Middle East, was
briefed on
“Day After issues”.54
That
included detail on SSR preparations. On policing,
Mr O’Brien
was told that the UK’s experience in other areas, such as Bosnia,
“should
mean we
would be well placed to share our expertise with the US and help
influence
their
thinking on the issue”. A scoping paper “which could be shared with
the US” on the
establishment
of an independent Iraqi judiciary was also
commissioned.
69.
More broadly,
the briefing stated:
“It was
agreed that the US saw themselves as the lead nation. On Security
Sector
Reform, we
should ensure that we feed in to their decision making
process.
We could
suggest leading on those areas where we have expertise eg:
good
governance.”
70.
On 14
February, Mr Drummond produced a note for Sir David
Manning on “key
messages
for the US” which outlined a number of decisions that needed to be
taken.55
On SSR he
wrote:
“If we are
not to replicate the problems seen in Afghanistan, we will also
need the
US to agree
early to [sic] single holistic plan for Security Sector Reform. We
have
offered
outline proposals on the security sector. We should offer a
plan.”
71.
The following
week, the US hosted a Rock Drill: an inter‑agency rehearsal for
the
post‑conflict
administration of Iraq. It was attended by a team of UK officials
led by
Mr Chilcott
and is described in detail in Section 6.5.
72.
On 20
February, Mr Chilcott submitted advice to Mr Straw,
including an IPU
guidance
note for officials participating in the Rock Drill.56
There was a
brief mention
of SSR
activities in the context of maximising “involvement of the Iraqis
in most tasks,
including:
policing … judiciary … and some security forces”.
73.
In an update
to Mr Blair shortly after the Rock Drill, Mr Nicholas
Cannon, Mr Blair’s
Assistant
Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs, provided an overview of work
undertaken
by the IPU,
including on humanitarian and economic issues.57
Mr Cannon
did not
mention
SSR.
74.
On 25
February, the IPU produced a ‘UK Vision for Phase
IV’.58
The paper
was
sent to
Sir David Manning the following day, copied to the offices of
Mr Gordon Brown,
54
Minute
APS/Mr O’Brien to Chilcott, 11 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Day After
Issues’.
55
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 14 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Winning the
Peace’.
56
Minute
Chilcott to Private Secretary [FCO], 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq:
Day‑After (Phase IV)’ attaching
Paper ‘Iraq
Day After: Guidance for Officials at US ROCK Drill’.
57
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 24 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq:
Aftermath Issues’.
58
Paper IPU,
25 February 2002, ‘UK Vision for Phase IV’.
80