The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
870.
In a letter
explaining his reasons to Lieutenant General Thomas Metz,
the
Commander
of MNC-I (see Box, ‘Creation of MNF-I, MNC-I and
MNSTC-I’),
Maj Gen Stewart
recognised that the refusal might:
“… appear
from Baghdad to be both ineffective and apparently out of line with
your
intent …
one size does not fit all for Iraq and the south east is different.
I believe
that our
actions are being effective … Whether we like it or not, Sadr’s
movement is
part of the
political fabric in southern Iraq … This does not mean that the
south east
is under
the thumb of the Sadrists. On the contrary nearly all our
interlocutors …
express
dislike of his methods, but his sentiments resonate … Coalition
Forces and
[Iraqi
Security Forces] have secured … every municipal building within …
MND(SE)
… Most
importantly, we take the view that it is the Iraqis who will have
to go on living
here after
we depart and surely it is best to produce an Iraqi solution to an
Iraqi
problem … I
believe that our current tactics in MND(SE) are
correct.”
871.
In advance of
a meeting with President Bush, Mr Blair asked Sir Nigel
Sheinwald
for “a note
setting out a strategy for dealing with the range of problems we
face
872.
Sir Nigel’s 12
April response identified a number of elements that a
strategy
should
include:
“(i)
Military. We are starting to see, and need to entrench, a more
measured US
military
approach.
Above
all, we must
avoid fighting simultaneously on two fronts. We
cannot
afford to
lose the consent of the majority Shia population … [W]e should aim
to
settle the
MAS [Muqtada al-Sadr] problem first …
The US
needs to make an effort to re-cement the Coalition.
(ii)
Iraqiisation: we need
to revisit this and our old friend de-Ba’athification.
The key to
Fallujah and Najaf will be the insertion of Iraqi
forces, rather
than a
heavy and overt American presence on the streets. But this is
not
straightforward
given the lack of capacity of the newly formed Iraqi forces
…
(iii)
Inclusiveness: the Coalition needs to involve the IGC and local
sheikhs in
resolving
these problems. Above all we cannot afford to lose the IGC
…
(iv) Deal
with the causes: there are many deep sources of discontent, and
we
cannot hope
to deal with all of them. On both the Shia and Sunni sides,
we
need
programmes which (a) increase jobs, particularly for the young and
(b)
increase
personal security …
486
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 12 April 2004, ‘Iraq:
Strategy’.
348