9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
(v) The
political future: this needs to be set out more clearly: elections
at the end
of January,
prepared by the UN; interim government structures in
place
by 1 July
when we hand over sovereignty, with the UN again playing a
key
advisory
role, and better consultation on how to get there …
(vi) UN
role: we need to clarify and promote the UN role: electoral
support
and
political advice on the ground now; new UNSCR in May/June;
clear
UN
co-ordinating and political role from 1 July …
(vii) The
deadline: we must stick to the deadline of 1 July, but need to
make
a better
job of explaining ourselves. The date is right because it
remains
important
to make an early transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis, which
they
themselves
want …
(viii)
Communication: if we can agree a strategy like this, Bremer and the
IGC
should
promulgate it in a media offensive in Iraq.”
873.
Sir Nigel
concluded:
“We need to
emerge from your meeting with Bush on Friday with the message
that
you have an
agreed, comprehensive strategy covering the handling of the
immediate
crisis,
Iraq’s political future leading to elections in January, and the
role of the UN.”
874.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald told Dr Rice on 14 April that there were rumours of
imminent
further
military action in Fallujah.487
The UK
judged that would be very damaging, in Iraq
and
internationally and wanted attempts at mediation to continue “and
for the tension
gradually
to abate”. Dr Rice said that no decisions had been
taken.
875.
On 14 April,
the JIC issued an Assessment of security in Iraq, prompted by
events
in Fallujah
and attacks by JAM.488
The JIC’s
first two Key Judgements were:
“I.
Anti-Coalition forces occupy the centre of Fallujah. Their
determination to fight in
a confined
urban area represents a step change in capability and
threat.
“II. The
scale and extent of attacks mounted by the Mahdi Army and
associated
Shia
militants have come as a surprise. They are the first concerted
attacks by
Shia
militias on Coalition Forces. But attacks have been localised, have
now
reduced and
have only been supported by a minority of Shia. There is no
clear
evidence of
co-ordination between Sunni and Shia groups.”
876.
Key Judgement
VII was that:
“The
security situation may remain volatile even if a settlement is
reached in Fallujah
and Najaf.
The upsurge in violence has confirmed previous concerns over
the
weaknesses
of the Iraqi security forces.”
487
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 14 April 2004, ‘Conversation with US National
Security Adviser, 14 April’.
488
JIC
Assessment, 14 April 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
349