3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
to find
out where the Americans had got to, but to impress on them his
own
conviction
that we needed to ensure that inspections were
continued.”255
685.
Asked whether
the US had already changed tack, Sir David replied:
“I think
you are right about the Americans moving onto a different track …
the
perception
… was that containment was probably finished … but I don’t think,
at
that stage,
there was a view in London … that we had completely given up
on
containment.
We were waiting … to see what sort of pressure the US would
produce
in the
light of the debate that we knew was taking place in handling
Iraq.
“Our
concern … and the Prime Minister’s view … was that it [action on
Iraq] must
be retained
within the United Nations … I don’t think he thought … that it was
likely
that the
President … would accept containment any longer, and I suspect that
he
probably
didn’t think containment was relevant any longer; but I think he
did think
that there
was everything to play for in terms of trying to ensure that the
Iraq problem
remained
managed in an international context, rather than that the Americans
went
unilaterally
for regime change.”256
686.
Asked when
Iraq became a priority for the UK, Sir David Manning
responded:
“In the
early months of 2002 … we knew that we had to deal with Iraq as a
more
pressing
priority because the US Administration were going to insist on
making
it more
prominent. They were concerned about a threat from Iraq in a new
way
because
they believed threats internationally were now threats they had to
meet
rather than
contain.
“… Iraq was
given a salience, it was given an importance because the
US
Administration
was determined to confront the international community over
this
perceived
threat. Therefore we had to respond to that.”257
687.
Asked about
the rationale for focusing on Iraq in the early months of
2002,
Sir David
Manning replied:
“… because
the US Administration was determined to confront the
international
community
over this perceived threat. Therefore, we had to respond to that
…
This was
something that the Prime Minister wanted resolved in an
international
context …
he wanted the inspectors to be reintroduced into Iraq … and he
believed
international
pressure was the best way of trying to ensure that happened,
and
that in
turn was the best way of managing the Iraq crisis that had been
given a new
prominence
by an American Administration that was no longer willing to settle
for
255
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 75-76.
256
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 76-77.
257
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 78.
258
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, pages 78-79.
513