9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
short‑term
political gain of early withdrawal than by the long-term importance
of
mission
accomplishment; and that, as a result, MND(SE)’s operational
posture is too
laissez
faire and lacks initiative …”
“… if US
opinion is allowed to drift down its current course, we risk
sacrificing the
grand
strategic aim (the UK/US special relationship) of our whole
engagement in
Iraq, for
the sake of short term domestic … expediency.”
731.
Looking ahead
to the future, Gen Jackson continued:
“As ever,
the campaign prognosis from Basra’s perspective is somewhat rosier
than
that from
Baghdad; though the difference is less marked than on previous
visits …
“The
Governor of Basra aside, GOC MND(SE) was reasonably optimistic
about
political
progress in the South East though much hinges on continuing Shia
political
coherence
…
“If the
Shia fault-lines are torn asunder, which is not inconceivable, all
bets are off.
“From the
military perspective, MND(SE)’s very clear focus remains rightly
upon
transition
in its four provinces. Muthanna is certainly ripe for Provincial
Iraqi Control
(PIC) … In
Basra, PIC is some way off, not only due to the malign influence
of
Governor
Wahili, but also because the local IPS is particularly weak … In
Dhi Qar,
progress
towards PIC is steady …
“Lastly, in
Maysan, there continues to be a serious difference of US and UK
opinion
over
transition … it was clear that MNC-I do not yet believe that the
appropriate
conditions
have been set … On the other hand, GOC MND(SE)’s argument in
favour
of early
transition in Maysan is compelling … First, there is a level of
expectation
in Maysan
that they will be granted PIC as a reward for good behaviour …
Should
this
aspiration not be met, we can expect a violent backlash. Second,
and probably
more
persuasive, is GOC MND(SE)’s argument about diminishing returns …
Indeed,
his view
that ‘standing
still is going backwards’ suggests
that we are approaching
the stage
in Maysan where our presence will be seen as part of the problem
not the
solution.”
732.
Gen Jackson’s
visit report concluded:
“My final
reflection from this visit … is that even if we deliver the agenda
of transition
laid out by
the campaign plan, what we will leave behind will not look much
like
strategic
success. Ten years hence our strategy may fully bear fruit. But in
the short
term Iraq
will most probably be characterised by spikes of violence,
continuing
sectarian
strife, fragile governance and stuttering economic development
…
I agree
that we need to start shaping the views of domestic and political
audiences
accordingly.”
609