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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
ARRC to be a genuine contender. Furthermore, given the pace of progress in Iraq,
there is a risk that should deployment later be deemed appropriate, HQ ARRC could
find itself employed as a stopgap between US commands rather than as part of a
wider strategic shift as originally envisaged.”
464.  On 13 October, Mr Richmond reported that Ambassador Bremer’s frustration with
the GC, and in particular its ineffective decision-making processes, had led him to take
steps to improve its operation. These were “focused on the need to make the current
structures work” because he was “especially loathe to change the seven steps”.264
465.  Sir Jeremy Greenstock called on Mr Blair in London on 15 October.265 During their
meeting, Sir Jeremy said that, unlike in Baghdad:
“… a virtuous circle seemed to be building up in the South, with locals supporting the
reconstruction process and turning in to the Coalition outsiders who disrupted it.”
466.  Sir Jeremy also reported new security threats, which might include the risk
of rioters storming their premises or of assassination by “suborning Iraqi support
staff”. Sir Jeremy observed that the terrorists and supporters of Saddam Hussein
“were ‘mutating’ in their structures and methods faster than Coalition intelligence
could keep up”.
467.  A response by the Coalition, in Sir Jeremy’s view, should include:
Iraqiisation, but “real capability” was a year away;
combatting Sunni marginalisation;
a more flexible approach to de-Ba’athification;
internationalisation; and
improved border control, requiring up to 20,000 troops.
468.  In relation to the new resolution, Sir Jeremy said that:
“… the timing of this had been far from ideal from a CPA perspective: it would have
had a greater impact in two months’ time. He urged closer co-ordination between
London and IraqRep on such issues.”
469.  On 15 October, the JIC assessed that:
“The security situation remains difficult in central Iraq. The upward trend in the
number of attacks against the Coalition Forces shows no sign of abatement … The
vast majority of attacks (some 80 percent) occur in Baghdad and the surrounding
Sunni Arab areas. The level of attacks elsewhere is significantly less, although
Mosul in the north may be a developing hotspot …
264  Telegram 217 IraqRep to FCO London, 13 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political Process’.
265  Letter Cannon to Owen, 16 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s call on the Prime Minister’.
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