The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
ARRC to be
a genuine contender. Furthermore, given the pace of progress in
Iraq,
there is a
risk that should deployment later be deemed appropriate, HQ ARRC
could
find itself
employed as a stopgap between US commands rather than as part of
a
wider
strategic shift as originally envisaged.”
464.
On 13 October,
Mr Richmond reported that Ambassador Bremer’s frustration
with
the GC, and
in particular its ineffective decision-making processes, had led
him to take
steps to
improve its operation. These were “focused on the need to make the
current
structures
work” because he was “especially loathe to change the seven
steps”.264
465.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock called on Mr Blair in London on 15
October.265
During
their
meeting,
Sir Jeremy said that, unlike in Baghdad:
“… a
virtuous circle seemed to be building up in the South, with locals
supporting the
reconstruction
process and turning in to the Coalition outsiders who disrupted
it.”
466.
Sir Jeremy
also reported new security threats, which might include the
risk
of rioters
storming their premises or of assassination by “suborning Iraqi
support
staff”.
Sir Jeremy observed that the terrorists and supporters of
Saddam Hussein
“were ‘mutating’
in their structures and methods faster than Coalition
intelligence
could keep up”.
467.
A response by
the Coalition, in Sir Jeremy’s view, should include:
•
Iraqiisation,
but “real capability” was a year away;
•
combatting
Sunni marginalisation;
•
a more
flexible approach to de-Ba’athification;
•
internationalisation;
and
•
improved
border control, requiring up to 20,000 troops.
468.
In relation to
the new resolution, Sir Jeremy said that:
“… the
timing of this had been far from ideal from a CPA perspective: it
would have
had a
greater impact in two months’ time. He urged closer co-ordination
between
London and
IraqRep on such issues.”
469.
On 15 October,
the JIC assessed that:
“The
security situation remains difficult in central Iraq. The upward
trend in the
number of
attacks against the Coalition Forces shows no sign of abatement …
The
vast
majority of attacks (some 80 percent) occur in Baghdad and the
surrounding
Sunni Arab
areas. The level of attacks elsewhere is significantly less,
although
Mosul in
the north may be a developing hotspot …
264
Telegram
217 IraqRep to FCO London, 13 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
265
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 16 October 2003, ‘Iraq: Sir Jeremy Greenstock’s
call on the Prime Minister’.
284