9.1 |
March to 22 May 2003
to attempt
to run HQs in Iraq at Corps, Divisional and Brigade levels
simultaneously
would be,
to say the least, a very ambitious undertaking. It is unlikely (at
best) in
these
circumstances that we could command at Divisional level more than
one
brigade in
addition to our own, and this would limit the number of provinces
we could
supervise.
Even then, recuperating from such an effort would be a major
challenge,
and it
would be years before the Armed Forces recovered the ‘steady
state’
capability
which our planning assumptions say they should provide. Finally, we
could
not enter
into such a commitment without having absolute certainty about who
would
The ARRC is
a ready-formed and trained HQ, commanded by a three-star officer,
which
can deploy
within five to 30 days.118
It was
created in 1992 in Germany as an operational
HQ. It does
not have fighting capability, but its approximately 1,000 staff are
able to
command up
to four multi-national divisions (around 100,000 personnel). The
ARRC is
able to
deploy the communications systems necessary for a command role of
this size,
and the
support services needed to take care of its own
personnel.
The UK is
the ‘framework’ or lead nation for the ARRC and provides around 60
percent of
its staff;
other members of NATO provide the remaining 40 percent. To deploy
the ARRC
without
NATO staff, the UK would need to backfill those posts.
The ARRC is
deployable once every two to three years. Its first deployment was
to Bosnia
in December
1995.
223.
Major General
Adrian Bradshaw, who succeeded Major General Graham Binns
as
Commander
of 7 Armoured Brigade, told the Inquiry “things were relatively
calm” when
he first
arrived in Iraq in April 2003 but “it was clear that we had an
urgent task to rebuild
224.
At the request
of the FCO, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) provided
an
Assessment
titled ‘The Initial Landscape Post-Saddam’ on 16
April.120
In it the
JIC
judged
that:
“The
situation in Iraq is complex, fast-moving and confused. In the very
near term,
remnants of
the regime will continue to present a limited threat to
the
re-establishment
of peace and stability in Iraq. But other threats to either
Coalition
forces or
the longer term post-Saddam political process are
emerging.”
117
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 17 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Possible Role for the
ARRC’.
119
Private
hearing, 2 June 2010, pages 5-8.
120
JIC
Assessment, 16 April 2003, ‘Iraq: the Initial Landscape
Post-Saddam’.
167