9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
and
regulating other matters such as the use of bases, freedom of
movement etc” was
still
required, and had run into difficulties.
319.
Drafts had
been prepared in early December, but discussions were put
on
hold while
passage of the law was in progress. After the resolution was passed
on
23 December,
Iraqi officials did not appear willing to re-engage on the
letters.
320.
Mr Prentice
and Mr Watkins met their key contact on 28 December and were
told
that it
remained the Iraqi Government’s intention to complete the
authorisation process
in time for
the letters to be signed on 31 December, but the indications were
that there
would be
further delays within the Iraqi system. Mr Watkins
commented:
“This is an
unwelcome turn of events, although we had not expected the
finalisation
of the EoL
[Exchange of Letters] to be straightforward … Subject to
developments
tomorrow,
there is a risk that the CoM [Council of Ministers] on Tuesday will
(at
Maliki’s
behest) circumscribe the authorisation of our tasks in a way that
effectively
gives us a
‘training only’ mission in 2009 (which, the cynic might suspect,
was his
aim all
along). We will have two options:
•
Conclude
the EoL on this basis (and inform the US that we will have to
cease
‘operational’
MITTing – and so induce an accelerated deployment of US
forces
into Basra
…)
•
Push for
combat authorisations and accept delay in the signature of the
EoL
beyond 31
December, leading to another operational ‘pause’ …”
321.
Just over 24
hours before the expiry of resolution 1790, at 2230 on 30
December
Mr Prentice
signed an MOU with the Iraqi Minister of Defence on behalf of the
UK
and Iraqi
Governments.122
The
Australians signed their own MOU the same day; other
coalition
partners were continuing their negotiations, supported by the US.
Mr Prentice
reported to
the FCO that:
“A further
UK-Iraq agreement is planned, to cover non-operational training
tasks
which will
continue beyond 31 May. This may also need to be put to the
CoR
[Council of
Representatives] in due course.”
322.
In his
evidence to the Inquiry, Lt Gen Cooper commented that the terms of
the
UK’s MOU
had not been as strong as the Status of Forces Agreement that the
Iraqis had
negotiated
with the US, but it was sufficient for the tasks that UK forces
were conducting
323.
Asked by the
Inquiry why the UK had settled for an MOU rather than pushing for
a
Status of
Forces Agreement like the US, Mr Prentice explained that, by
this stage, there
was
“exhaustion in the Iraqi body politic with the idea of
international agreements” and,
122
eGram
51110/08 Baghdad to FCO London, 31 December 2008, ‘Iraq: MOU Signed
Sealing Legal Basis
for UK
Forces Post 2008’.
123
Public
hearing, 15 December 2009, page 88.
433