6.3  |  Military equipment (pre-conflict)

95.  Lt Gen Pigott explained that current commitments in Afghanistan44 and subsequent

recovery and deployment times would “limit the UK’s ability to contribute significantly to

any offensive operations in the region until November at the earliest”.

96.  If it was “likely that the UK would wish to contribute” to US action “when the call

came”, there was a “need to consider what action” was needed “now to reduce risks

and as far as possible readiness times”.

97.  Mr Hoon was asked to agree further work to refine contingency planning, to be

submitted in mid-June; and informed that “proper preparations” would require wider

involvement in the MOD and discreet approaches to industry.

98.  Mr Hoon wrote to Mr Blair on 31 May, explaining that UK contingency planning

had concluded that, for the UK to have influence on US planning, a significant military

contribution would be needed. That was defined as at “division level” for land forces.45

99.  Mr Hoon suggested raising “in general terms, that our contingency planning has

shown we need plenty of warning in order to be able to contribute to military action”.

100.  The SPG produced a paper in preparation for a “Strategic Think Tank on Iraq”,

to be held by the Chiefs of Staff on 18 June.46

101.  While the paper was not designed to consider equipment in detail, a section on

“UK enablers” briefly considered force capability requirements. It reiterated the analysis

of 24 May about what would be possible with either three, six or nine months warning.

The paper also identified additional requirements for force protection, including “NBC”

[Nuclear, Biological and Chemical] protection.

102.  The MOD has been unable to locate any record of the think tank discussion.

103.  Subsequent revisions of the paper before the end of 2002 are addressed later

in this Section and in Section 6.1.

104.  Mr Tom McKane, Deputy Head of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence

Secretariat (OD Sec), wrote to Sir David Manning, Mr Blair’s Foreign Policy Adviser

and Head of OD Sec, about the think tank discussion the same day.47 He recognised

that there was “a huge amount of work to be done if the UK is to be in a position to

participate in any operation against Iraq”.

44  The UK had deployed 45 Commando Royal Marines from May to July 2002 as part of Operation

JACANA that targeted Taliban and Al-Qaida fugitives in Afghanistan. GOV.UK, 14 January 2014,

The UK’s work in Afghanistan: timeline.

45  Minute Hoon to Prime Minister, 31 May 2002, ‘Iraq’.

46  Minute Driver to PSO/CDS, 13 June 2002, ‘Supporting Paper for COS Strategic Think Tank on Iraq –

18 Jun’ attaching Paper [SPG], 12 June 2002, [untitled].

47  Minute McKane to Manning, 18 June 2002, ‘Iraq’.

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