The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
information
on Saddam’s options given the efforts which would be needed
for
reconstruction
of the oilfields”.153
•
Saddam was
“likely to use CBW first in southern Iraq, if anywhere”.
The
implications
needed further discussion in the final Assessment “to bring out
the
scale of
the potential humanitarian crisis”, which would, in the initial
period, need
to be dealt
with by Coalition troops.
428.
The JIC’s Key
Judgements were:
“•
The Iraqi
forces currently guarding southern Iraq are a relatively weak first
line
of
conventional defence. They face rapid defeat. There is little
evidence so
far that
the Iraqis are preparing for a hard-fought defence of Basra and
other
urban
centres.
•
Southern
Iraq is the most likely area for the first use of CBW against
both
Coalition
Forces and the local population.
•
Coalition
Forces will face large refugee flows, possibly compounded
by
contamination
and panic caused by CBW use. They may also face
millions
of Iraqis
needing food and clean water without an effective UN presence
and
environmental
disaster from burning oil wells.
•
Iran does
not have an agreed policy on Iraq beyond active
neutrality.
Nevertheless
Iran may support small-scale cross-border interventions by
armed
groups to
attack the Mujahideen e-Khalq (MEK). The Islamic
Revolutionary
Guards
Corps (IRGC) will continue to meddle in southern Iraq. Iranian
reactions
to a
Coalition presence in Southern Iraq remain unclear but are unlikely
to be
aggressive.
•
Post-Saddam
the security situation in the south will be unpredictable. There
is
a high risk
of revenge killings of former regime officials. Law and order may
be
further
undermined by settling of scores between armed tribal
groups.
•
Popular
support for any post-Saddam administration in the South will depend
on
adequately
involving the Shia in the government of Iraq as a whole as well
as
engaging
the remains of the state bureaucracy in the South, local tribal
leaders
and Shia
clerics in local government.”
429.
The Assessment
stated that there was “limited intelligence on the
particular
conditions
of southern Iraq”. It had, therefore, “Where possible tried to show
how
southern
Iraq may differ from other parts of the country” and “to give as
full a picture
as possible
of the conditions there”. It had also “referred to intelligence
describing
conditions
prevailing throughout the country”.
153
Minutes, 19
February 2003, JIC meeting.
450