The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

to al-Sadr about the positive effect of the agreement. JAM1 told the officials that “our

agreement with him was safe” but broadening and deepening it would be difficult and

would need to be dealt with via a third party (his lawyer) for the time being.

502. The officials also met JAM1’s lawyer separately on 11 October, who reiterated his

request for JAM1 to be released.

503. In an email reporting the meeting, officials reported surprise at the extent to which

the Secret Cells had acquiesced in the cease-fire and commented:

“But this good news presents us with more thinking to do. Specifically: is it

appropriate that we ask [JAM1] to police Basra not just through policing of his own

ranks but also those of other organisations? Does this, perhaps, leads [sic] us too

quickly down the uncertain road of vigilantism?”

504. In the weekly update for Mr Brown on 12 October, a Cabinet Office official reported

that his statement had “played well in Baghdad and coalition capitals, especially in

Washington where the Administration was pleased at the prior levels of co-ordination

which had taken place, as well as the content of the statement itself”.243

505. Although Gen Petraeus had welcomed the statement, he had been “quick to query

the UK’s longer term intentions in Iraq, for 2009 and beyond”, making it likely that US-UK

planning discussions would now shift to that timeframe.

506. The Cabinet Office official told Mr Brown that the security situation in Basra

remained “relatively calm”. Governor Waili’s appeal against his dismissal from post had

been successful, and the UK planned to “resume low-key co-operation with him in the

interests of moving beyond the political stand-off in Basra” whilst the Iraq Government

took other steps towards his dismissal.

507. An MOD official provided advice to Mr Browne on 12 October, seeking his

agreement to the release of a further four detainees “to underpin the authority of [JAM1]

and thus his ability to maintain control over JAM and other elements in Basra”.244

None of the four individuals was considered to be high risk.

508. This was not the submission on aims and negotiation strategy discussed at

Mr Day’s meeting on 4 October; further more detailed advice covering those points

was promised.

509. Under “presentational issues” the advice said:

“We have recently developed a revised strategy for handling this process. This

involves being more forward about the need for reconciliation between Iraqi groups

as a major part of solving the country’s security problems (this was a major feature

243 Minute Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 12 October 2007, ‘Iraq – Weekly Update’.

244 Minute Freer to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 12 October 2007, ‘Negotiations with JAM: latest

position’ including manuscript comment Browne.

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