The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
238.
The brief for
Mr Blair stated:
•
The purpose
of the policy had been to ensure that Iraq was disarmed
through
two main
elements:
{{disarmament
through inspections regimes; and
{{reducing
Iraq’s ability to finance its WMD programmes by controlling
its
revenues
from oil.
•
The policy
had had “some success in dismantling Saddam’s arsenal when
the
inspectors
were able to operate”, and it had “slowed his efforts to rebuild
WMD”.
The arms
embargo had “been effective in preventing Saddam acquiring
new
complete
weapons systems”.
•
But, “in
the absence of inspectors” Iraq could “work on its WMD
programmes
unimpeded”
and Iraq was “in violation of a string of Security Council
resolutions
intended to
curb” those programmes.
•
Controls on
revenues were “eroding”, giving Saddam Hussein “access to
large
sums over
which the international community had no control” and “much” of
that
was
“certainly going into his high‑priority WMD
programmes”.
•
Although
the sanctions regime had been “targeted on goods of most
concern”,
no
sanctions regime would “be completely effective in stopping a
ruthless and
well‑funded
regime getting its hands on some of the goods and
technology
needed for
a WMD programme”.
239.
The FCO
response to Mr Blair’s questions on Iraq’s WMD, which
stated
unequivocally
that Iraq had and was hiding WMD and that it had continued
its
chemical,
biological, nuclear and ballistic missile programmes after the
departure of the
UN weapons
inspectors in 1998, is addressed in Section 4.2
240.
In his
press conference, Mr Blair stated that Saddam Hussein was,
“without
any
question, still trying to develop” a “chemical, biological,
potentially nuclear
capability”;
and that to allow him to do so would be
“irresponsible”.
241.
As he had
discussed with President Bush, Mr Blair framed Iraq’s position
as
a challenge
to the UN which the UN should address.
242.
Mr Blair’s
remarks indicated that time and patience were running out and
that
there were
difficulties with the existing policy of containment.
243.
Mr Blair
announced that the “dossier” setting out the evidence of
Iraq’s
attempts to
develop its “chemical, biological and potentially nuclear
capability”
would be
published in the “next few weeks”.
244.
Mr Campbell
wrote that the hardest question to answer was “Why
now?”
136