The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
193.
On the search
for evidence, the letter stated:
“People who
are prepared to discuss WMD are gradually emerging to
provide
information.
Most have only small pieces of the jigsaw, but these do confirm
some of
the
original judgements: continued CW production until mid-late 2002;
replacement
of the
large, static BW programme with a covert, transportable capacity; a
massive
effort in
the months before the conflict to break up and conceal much of the
WMD
(which may
thus have been inaccessible when the conflict began); the start of
work
to develop
extended range missiles, beyond UN-sanctioned limits; and the
highly
restricted
circle of those really in the know. Further interviewing of senior
detainees
is likely
to deliver more insights …”
194.
SIS assessed
that the most important piece of evidence found so far was
“the
various BW
trailers, which we are now firmly of the view are part of the
transportable
production
system (TPS) for BW agent”. New information was also emerging on
Iraq’s
CW and
missile programmes.
195.
The letter
stated that, despite the emergence of new information, the UK
and
international
media continued to report that there was no evidence to justify the
claims
made by the
UK and the US before the war. It was not in the interests of the
Government
or SIS to
allow that to become received wisdom. SIS was working on a media
strategy
with the
FCO, the MOD and others to address those points.
196.
SIS also
reported that BBC
Television’s
Panorama
planned to
make a programme
on Iraqi
WMD for broadcast later that year. SIS suggested that the
Government provide
assistance
to the programme-maker while taking care not to hijack the
programme.
The onus
would still be on the programme-maker to seek independent expert
advice.
SIS advised
that there was a greater risk in the programme being made without
the
Government’s
help, and that the programme-maker “might take at face value the
denials
of senior
detainees and be without the technical knowledge and guidance we
can offer”.
197.
A copy of the
SIS letter was shown to Mr Blair by Sir David Manning, with
the
comment:
“Evidence beginning to build. Suggestions here too for media – that
need to
be reviewed
with Alastair [Campbell]”.106
198.
Mr Blair
replied to Sir David Manning: “A[lastair] C[ampbell] to speak to me
about
this.”107
Mr Blair
described as “vital” the letter’s assessment of evidence emerging
to
support
pre-invasion judgements.
199.
Sir David
Manning sent Mr Blair’s comment to Sir Richard Dearlove’s
Private Office
106
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter PS/C to McDonald, 16 May 2003,
‘Iraqi WMD’.
107
Manuscript
comment Blair on Letter PS/C to McDonald, 16 May 2003, ‘Iraqi
WMD’.
108
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter PS/C to McDonald, 16 May 2003,
‘Iraqi WMD’.
464