12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
1193.
On 20
December, the JIC assessed:
“77,000
Concerned Local Citizens (CLCs) and other tribal ‘awakenings’,
drawn from
the Sunni
insurgency and, to a much lesser extent, from Shia militias, are
now acting
as force
multipliers for MNF and ISF in Baghdad and along the Euphrates and
Tigris
valleys
north of Baghdad. The MOI continue to resist assuming formal
responsibility
for these
volunteers (including paying them). If their payments stopped we
judge that
many would
resume attacks on the MNF and ISF. Their loyalty to central
government
is likely
to remain patchy in the absence of broader national reconciliation;
we judge
they are
likely to become an increasingly attractive target for infiltration
by both
Sunni and
Shia extremists.”1118
1194.
On 8 January
2008, Air Marshal Stuart Peach, Chief of Defence
Intelligence,
briefed the
Chiefs of Staff that there were plans to integrate 20 percent of
the Concerned
Local
Citizens into the ISF, with the remainder being available for hire
by other ministries
for public
works programmes.1119
US funding
was due to expire in January 2008 and
future
funding arrangements were unclear. He noted that failure to address
the issue
could lead
to resentment and a return to violence among former Sunni fighters
but that
provision
for Concerned Local Citizen salaries would probably be opposed by a
number
of Shia
groups.
1195.
On 5 June, the
JIC assessed that, of the approximately 106,000
(mainly
Sunni) Sons
of Iraq, around 16,300 had been recruited into the ISF, mainly in
Anbar
province.1120
Elsewhere,
relations between ISF and the Sons of Iraq were described
as
“tense”.
The creation of a Sons of Iraq programme in Basra in 2008 is
described later in
this
Section. Considering the future, the JIC assessed:
“MNF
reporting suggests that at least a quarter of SoI [Sons of Iraq]
members
expect jobs
in the ISF: for others, some form of continued stipend or civil
service
job would
probably suffice. The GoI is unlikely to be willing or able to meet
either
expectation;
or assume responsibility for commanding and paying the SoI this
year.
So long as
it does not, we judge that SoI rejection of AQ‑I, tolerance of MNF
and
willingness
to refrain from anti‑government violence will be fragile.
[…]”
1196.
An eGram from
Baghdad on 7 October reported that the Iraqi Government
had
taken
responsibility for paying the Sons of Iraq located in Baghdad, (50
percent of the
103,000
total) from 1 October.1121
Responsibility
for the other half would follow later that
month. The
Iraqi Government and the Sons of Iraq did, however, remain
suspicious of
one
another: the Iraqi Government believing that the number of the Sons
of Iraq had
been
“inflated by the various leaders in order to line their own
pockets”, and the Sons
1118 JIC
Assessment, 20 December 2007, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: Two Steps
Forward’.
1119 Minutes, 8
January 2008, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
1120
JIC
Assessment, 5 June 2008, ‘Iraqi Security Forces: More Able, Less
Challenged’.
1121
eGram
39659/08 Baghdad to FCO, 7 October 2008, ‘Iraq: the Awakening
Movement and the Sons
of Iraq’.
333