The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
We should
preclude only a small number of members of the old regime …
from
participating
in the post-Saddam political order. We will most likely need
the
assistance
of many associated in some way with the old regime to
maintain
order and
establish a new viable state …
•
We should
avoid imposing a particular ruler or party on Iraq, but cannot
allow
Iraq to
degenerate into chaos … We should work with our partners to launch
a
political
process that will allow the Iraqi people to move toward
self-government …
•
We need to
contain potential meddling by Iraq’s neighbours, as well as
by
other
international actors … We need to maintain broad and effective
bilateral
dialogue
with these countries, forge a six plus two-like
forum302
for
co-ordination
among
Iraq’s neighbours and most interested outside powers, and … strive
to
develop new
mechanisms to manage security concerns in the region as well
as
promote
economic linkages …
•
… We should
assert forceful, public [US] leadership of the security
operations,
and then
guide the other components of the reconstruction effort from behind
the
scenes as
we are now doing in Afghanistan.”
564.
The Haass
memorandum did not have an impact in Washington. Mr
Haass
recorded
that Secretary Powell agreed most of it and sent copies to
Secretary Rumsfeld,
Dr Rice and
Vice President Cheney:
“No one
could argue that these perspectives had not been raised, although
it
was true
that the lack of any meaningful inter-agency process or oversight
of the
aftermath
made it too easy for the Defense Department (which was essentially
left
by the NSC
to oversee itself) to ignore advice from the outside.”
565.
A copy of the
memorandum was handed to UK officials by the State
Department
566.
The
“aftermath” section of the fourth edition of the SPG paper on
UK
strategic
military thinking:
•
raised
concerns about US post-conflict policy, including the US
approach
to
de-Ba’athification, which could run counter to the need for
basic
governance
and increase post-conflict reliance on the external
authority;
•
listed the
principal post-conflict challenges in Iraq, including law and
order
and
effective administration;
302 Afghanistan’s
six neighbours (Iran, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, China
and Pakistan),
the US and
Russia.
303
Manuscript
comment [unattributed] on Paper [unattributed and undated],
‘Reconstruction in Iraq –
Lessons of
the Past’.
208