The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
442.
Lord Bach was
informed that there were “some unsatisfied demands due to
sizing
issues but
new stock from contractors should clear these in the very near
future”. The
full
requirement for boots was “the greatest concern and may not be
fully met until the
end of
April”.
“Notwithstanding
that sufficient clothing is now in theatre to meet demands …
some
individuals
have not received any clothing. There are a number of reasons for
this
ranging
from unit ordering errors to consignments being mis-located or
being pushed
down the
priority list in theatre. The DLO in the UK and the JFLogC [Joint
Force
Logistic
Component] in theatre are urgently carrying out an audit and
progressively
the problem
is being ameliorated.”
444.
Brig Jeffrey
wrote that the DLO, DPA, PJHQ, and National Contingent
Headquarters
(NCHQ) did “not have good visibility of the fast moving situation
in the
Division
with regards to UOR fitting”. That had meant “information on
exactly what UORs
had been
fully fitted was not always available, nor was it prudent to press
the Divisional
staffs for
this information at the height of battle”.
445.
Lord Bach’s
Private Office replied on 11 April, acknowledging the points
raised
and adding:
“But I
think he [Lord Bach] will be interested to understand exactly which
of the
UORs on
which he has been briefed over recent months were not in the event
fitted
despite
having been available in theatre.”218
446.
The record of
Lord Bach’s meeting on 14 April highlighted his concern that
he did
not have
“the visibility of equipment issues at the front line that he
expected (and which
he was
reassured would be provided through the chain of
command)”.219
His
Private
Office
wrote:
“An example
of the ad hoc nature of this reporting is on Combat ID: the first
time
Minister(DP)
was made aware that CR2s [Challenger 2s] without it were
being
used
operationally was following the blue on blue incident on
25 March. The
presentational
and moral repercussions had the CR2s in question not been
fitted
with Combat
ID cannot be overstated.”
447.
Lord Bach
sought advice on:
“(i) the
extent to which shortfalls of key items (such as desert clothing)
remain
in theatre
and what action is planned to ameliorate them; (ii) which UORs
have
been
delivered to theatre but not – for whatever reason – passed on to
the
218
Minute
PS/Minister(DP) to D Log Ops, 11 April 2003 ‘Iraq: Op TELIC
UORs – Delivery’.
219
Minute
APS/Min(DP) to MA/DCDS(EC), 14 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Op TELIC –
UORs’.
70