3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
273.
Officials in
No.10 “decided, after careful consideration, that the meeting
should not
be recorded
because it didn’t change anything … it was a very personal meeting
and a
very
personal discussion and that in operational terms … the track … was
unchanged”.93
274.
Asked
specifically in the light of that evidence if he had discussed
whether
Mr Blair
should go ahead with committing British troops to military action
when the
second
resolution failed, Mr Straw told the Inquiry that his minute
of 11 March “set out
for
Mr Blair the different routes open to him in the event of us
not getting the second
UNSCR and
my judgements on those various courses of action”.94
In the
meeting on
12 March,
he had “made clear” to Mr Blair that he “had options other
than committing
to the
invasion, and that these were still open to him, should he want to
take them”.
275.
The Inquiry
asked Mr Blair if Mr Straw or any of his Cabinet
colleagues had tried
to dissuade
Mr Blair from taking military action in Iraq, and, if so,
when.95
276.
In his
statement Mr Blair wrote:
“It was
clear following 1441 that if Saddam did not comply fully and
unconditionally,
military
action was likely. No-one tried to persuade me not to take this
course, other
than those
who publicly and openly declared themselves, like Robin Cook
and
certain
ministers, who later resigned over the absence of a second
resolution.
“It is
correct that Jack, shortly before we were due to go in, warned me
of the
political
perils of doing so. I was well aware of them. But for me the issue
was
straightforward:
we had got the US to go down the UN route and give
Saddam
a final
chance; he had not taken it; such co-operation as there was, was
under
the duress
of military action; if we backed away now, it would have
disastrous
consequences
for a tough stance on WMD and its proliferation; and for our
strategic
relationship
with the US, our key ally.”96
277.
Asked whether
his position was one of advocating to Mr Blair that he should
not
commit
British troops to military action, Mr Straw told the Inquiry
that was “probably
putting it
too strongly”.97
278.
Mr Straw
added that he:
•
had “never
wanted to give the false impression that when it came to it over
the
weekend [of
15 to 16 March] and then the decision on 17 [March] my
position
was
anything [other] than thoroughly to endorse the decision we did
come to,
which was
in favour of military action”;
93
Evidence
given to the Inquiry on condition of anonymity.
94
Statement,
19 January 2011, page 17.
95
Inquiry
request for a witness statement, 13 December 2010, Qs11a and 11b,
page 7.
96
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 16.
97
Public
hearing, 2 February 2011, page 105.
447