4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
278.
Iraq’s WMD
capabilities were briefly summarised in line with the
JIC
Assessment
of 27 February, including that Saddam Hussein would continue
with
his WMD
programmes.
279.
The Cabinet
Office ‘Iraq: Options Paper’, commissioned by Sir David
Manning
and
co-ordinated by OD Sec, was sent to Mr Blair by Sir David on 8
March, as
part of the
collection of “background briefs that you asked for” for the
meeting with
President Bush.122
The paper
is addressed in detail in Section 3.2.
280.
In relation to
WMD, the paper advised that containment had:
•
effectively
frozen Iraq’s nuclear programme;
•
prevented
Iraq from rebuilding its conventional arsenal to pre-Gulf
Conflict
levels;
•
severely
restricted Iraq’s ballistic missile programmes; and
•
hindered
Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons programmes.123
281.
The
intelligence was “poor”; and there was no greater threat now that
Saddam
would use
WMD than there had been in recent years.
282.
The ‘Options
Paper’ proposed consideration of a staged approach to
establish
international
support for military action, advising that for the five Permanent
Members
(P5) and
the majority of the UN Security Council to take the view that Iraq
was in breach
of the
cease-fire provisions of resolution 687 (1991):
“•
they would
need to be convinced that Iraq was in breach of its
obligations
regarding
WMD, and ballistic missiles. Such proof would need to
be
incontrovertible
and of large-scale activity. Current intelligence is
insufficiently
robust to
meet this criterion …; or
•
… Iraq
refused to admit UN inspectors after a clear ultimatum by the
Security
Council;
or
•
the UN
inspectors were re-admitted to Iraq and found sufficient evidence
of
WMD
activity or were again expelled trying to do so.”
283.
Mr Straw
stated that the WMD paper had to show that Iraq posed
an
exceptional
threat, and did not yet do so.
284.
The Cabinet
Office ‘Options Paper’ and the WMD paper were sent to Mr Straw
on
8
March.124
In relation
to the draft paper on WMD, Mr Straw commented that it
was:
“Good, but
should not Iraq be first and also have more text? The paper has to
show
why there
is an exceptional threat from Iraq. It does not quite do this
yet.”
122
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 8 March 2002, ‘Briefing for the
US’.
123
Paper
Cabinet Office, 8 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Options Paper’.
124
Minute
McDonald to Ricketts, 11 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
63