3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
succeed …
about the importance of the United Nations, about the prior
importance
of the
Middle East Peace Process.”
237.
Lord Wilson
also stated Mr Blair had finished the meeting by saying: “The
concerns
expressed
are justified. The management hasn’t gone crazy.”81
He
added:
“… those
are not the words of a man who has had the authority to proceed
on
a course
which is likely to lead to military action. It is about a Cabinet
which has
expressed
concern … They know that force is an essential ingredient in
policy
on Iraq.
…
“ … and I
think Robin Cook said that again, but the message was … they
were
worried
about the direction the US Administration was going and they wanted
the
Prime
Minister to use his power and influence to focus it on the United
Nations, on
getting the
inspectors back in and on giving Saddam Hussein a real fright to
get him
to
co-operate. They weren’t talking about military action … [T]he
whole flavour …
was, ‘Any
decisions on this are a long way away’ …”82
238.
Lord Wilson
also explained that Mr Cook had made a number of points in
January
1998, about
the need to be “ready to use force if necessary, because not being
ready …
would
undermine leverage over Saddam Hussein; and … the United States
were clear
they had
legal authority to take action whereas our legal advice was more
nuanced …
[T]hose are
things you could transpose” to March 2002.83
239.
Mr Straw told
the Inquiry that there was “great anxiety about the intentions of
the
240.
Mr Straw added
that he “would have been fairly circumspect” about his own
views
in the
discussion.85
He would
not “have spilled out all the things that I was saying
to
the Prime
Minister in private”, not least because he was “concerned about the
matter
leaking”.
241.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Cabinet was not exactly divided but there was “a lot
of
concern”
about where policy on Iraq was going. It was not a “row” but it had
immediately
been
briefed to the press as one.86
The next
day the papers were “full of division, threats
of
resignation over Iraq”, which were “untrue”.
81
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 73.
82
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 73-74.
83
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, pages 73-74.
84
Public
hearing, 8 February 2011, page 36.
85
Public
hearing, 8 February 2011, page 38.
86
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to Iraq.
Hutchinson,
2012.
429