10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
609.
Mr Browne
also said that DFID’s aspiration to move its focus to Baghdad
was
well
understood, but the UK had a significant stake in the South and
needed a clearer
understanding
of the impact of such a move on activity there.
610.
In discussion,
a member of DOP(I) said that most DFID projects in the South
were
likely to
be completed by spring 2007 and that no new projects could be
started under
current
security circumstances. The UK’s medium-term legacy depended on
getting
economic
management and reconciliation going and Baghdad functioning, which
meant
building
capacity in central ministries.
611.
DOP(I) agreed
that the UK should keep the existing policy goal, but recognise
that
the best
outcome achievable might fall short of it.
612.
It also agreed
that a progressive reduction of UK forces to 4,500 in 2007, in
concert
with US and
other allies, was possible, with more ambitious reductions being
considered
at the end
of November.
613.
The
medium-term prospects paper was discussed again at the 26 October
meeting
of DOP,
alongside an update from Mr Browne on security developments in
Iraq.353
614.
ACM Stirrup
advised that Op SINBAD “could not be going better,
although
there had
been an increase in the number of indirect fire attacks on the
Basra Palace
Compound”.
The main concern of Basrawis was whether the success of the
operation
could be
sustained, which “would require engagement and funds from the
Government
in
Baghdad”.
615.
DOP agreed the
analysis and recommendations contained in the
medium-term
prospects
paper.
616.
Section 15.1
describes the increasing threat posed by rocket and mortar fire
to
Basra
Palace Compound (BPC), and the discussions within the UK Government
on how
to
respond.
617.
At the 27
October meeting of the ISG, Mr Simon McDonald, FCO Director
Iraq,
reported
that the security situation in Basra had deteriorated to the point
where Mrs
Beckett had
decided it was necessary to withdraw the majority of civilian staff
from the
BPC to
Basra Air Station (BAS) or out of theatre.354
618.
The BPC housed
the British Embassy Office Basra, the DFID Basra
Office,
elements of
the police and prisons teams, and the PRT.355
MND(SE) was
already located
at
BAS.
619.
The lack of
hardened accommodation suitable for civilian staff at BAS meant
that
not all
staff could be relocated immediately.
353
Minutes, 26
October 2006, DOP meeting.
354
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 30 October 2006,
‘Iraq Strategy Group, 27 October’.
355
Paper Iraq
Policy Unit, 25 October 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra Palace
Site’.
297