9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
396.
Maj Gen Binns
explained that he needed to be able to approve a deal at
short
notice in
order to “keep the process alive”.
397.
Government
officials working closely with the military met JAM1 again
on
18 September
and said that “If the peace held there would be further releases in
23 days
or
so.”196
JAM1 said
that “it was time for us, the British, to establish proper plans
to
exploit
this period of reduction in hostilities. There should be three
clear headings:
Security,
Economics, Politics, each to be followed by an agreed
plan.”
398.
Reporting to
London following the meeting, the officials explained that hopes
of
demonstrable
development work in Basra attributed to the British had been dashed
by
the PRT,
whose “key themes are empowerment and mentoring – nothing that
smacks
either of
MNF direction or dictation”.
399.
Mr Browne
reported to Cabinet on 18 September that there had been little
change
in Iraq
over the past week: Basra was still calm and the level of attacks
on UK forces at
Basra Air
Station had reduced to “a very low level”.197
This was
primarily “a reflection of
political
developments within the various factions of Jaysh al-Mahdi, with
some wanting
to
participate in the political process and others … who were inclined
to violence”.
Both he and
Mr Brown would be meeting Gen Petraeus and Ambassador
Crocker
that
afternoon with a view to establishing US thinking on the medium to
longer term,
including
expectations of the UK.
400.
Mr Brown
said that there would need to be a discussion on Iraq in Cabinet in
the
next few
weeks.
401.
Mr Brown
and Mr Miliband, accompanied by ACM Stirrup and officials,
met
Gen Petraeus
and Ambassador Crocker on 18 September.198
Mr Brown
underlined how
successful
the handover of Basra Palace had been. Gen Petraeus agreed and said
that
a decision
on PIC could be possible later that year, but there were issues to
be resolved,
including
the status of the Governor. Nevertheless:
“By the
time of the Prime Minister’s statement in October, it might be
possible to give
a sense of
the timeframes, with November/December as a possible PIC
target.”
402.
Gen Petraeus
added that he considered it would be important to retain a
divisional
HQ in
Basra, given its political and economic significance.
403.
Mr Brown
said that economic development of the South remained a major
UK
priority
(see Section 10.2). Gen Petraeus said there were a number of
initiatives on
196
Email
government official working closely with the military, 19 September
2007, ‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]:
18 September meeting with JAM1’.
197
Cabinet
Conclusions, 18 September 2007.
198
Letter
Fletcher to Gould, 18 September 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with General Petraeus and
Ambassador
Ryan Crocker, 18 September’.
259