The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
98.
Maj Gen
Shirreff also set out his initial reflections on the situation
facing him.
He wrote:
“The issue
in Basra is the lack of security and until we establish this there
can be no
PIC. We can
only generate freedom of movement by mounting specific
operations,
often up to
company level, and we are effectively fixed by the lack of
concentrated
force. The
lack of security means that we cannot conduct the SSR needed
to
transform
the police, nor apply the economic inducements needed to isolate
the
militants
from the majority of militiamen who are only there because the
militia can
pay them.
Thus the enemy, militant JAM and the death squads linked to the
Basra
police …
are able to operate with relative impunity …
“In my
view, the only way we will achieve mission success is by winning
the battle
for Basra
and defeating militant JAM and the death squads (whether by
capturing,
or, if
necessary, by killing them in accordance with our ROE [Rules of
Engagement].
But we must
be clever about it. A blunt, solely kinetic approach risks getting
sucked
into a
series of running tactical battles against JAM that will get us
nowhere. We
must
isolate militant JAM from mainstream JAM and build the intelligence
picture in
order to
target them and the death squads connected to the police in Basra.
The key
to this is
energetic and sustained effort along the governance and economic
lines of
operation,
both of which remain inadequate … (the comprehensive approach did
not
exist).
Progress on these lines is essential to create and maintain
tolerance for our
operations
in Basra. It will also underwrite success on the security line of
operation.
There has
been plenty of planning but we need to make things
happen.”
99.
Maj Gen
Shirreff reported that he had had some preliminary
encouraging
discussions
about his proposed approach with Major General Latif, the
commander
of the
Iraqi Army’s 10th Division, based in Basra. However, it would be
fundamental to
ensure
that, behind any operation, there was political will in Baghdad.
Maj Gen Shirreff
undertook
to work closely with Mr Patey and the MNF commanders in
Baghdad “to
ensure that
we carry Maliki with us”.
100.
Prime Minister
Maliki visited London on 24 July, before travelling on to the
US.68
101.
A telegram
from Mr Patey reported:
“He
[Maliki] told me that he would focus during his visit on security
and the economy,
as well as
cementing long‑term bilateral relations. He said he needed Iraqi
forces
that can
take on the terrorists.”
102.
Prime Minister
Maliki visited No.10 for a bilateral meeting with Mr Blair
followed
by wider
talks.69
He told
Mr Blair that he was “trying hard to find a way forward with
the
68
eGram
31442/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 19 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Maliki’s Visit
to UK: Scene‑Setter’.
69
Letter
Phillipson to Siddiq, 25 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Maliki, 24 July’.
20