3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
“… Bush …
said in effect that destroying Saddam is a crusade against
evil
to be
undertaken by God’s chosen nation: ‘this call of history has come
to the
right people’.
“The target
of Bush’s messianic appeal was … the anxious and unconvinced
in
the country
at large … The call to rally to the flag, the President and to the
military
should, on
past precedent, evoke an emotional and positive response
…
“… The
novel element was the promise that Powell would produce fresh
evidence
of
collaboration between Saddam and Al Qaida. For the White House, the
key
to the questions
‘Why Iraq, why now?’ has always been the rogue
state/WMD/
terrorism
nexus: not as a worrying possibility in future years, but as a
clear and
present
danger.
“… if
Powell goes off at half‑cock, it will only reinforce, as Jeremy
Greenstock has
underlined
already, the view that the US is hell‑bent on war and
short‑circuiting
SCR 1441.
“The Prime
Minister will find on Friday a pretty implacable Bush: impatient,
deeply
disillusioned
with France and Germany, convinced that his – and Mr Blair’s –
critics
will be
routed by an early and easy military victory. He is very much
influenced by …
[the fact]
that in the past the US has failed to respond forcibly to multiple
provocation
and attacks
to the detriment of its reputation and standing. This time the US
could
not back
off.
“Unless we
have some good ideas for sending Saddam into exile, Mr Blair’s
task on
Friday will
be to ensure that we and the US go to war in the best company
possible.
That means
securing the time to assemble the largest possible coalition both
for the
war itself
and for the aftermath. If the notorious smoking gun can be found,
this will
make things
much easier …
“Bush does
not look to have the patience to let Blix make the case. I said in
an
earlier
report that exhausting the UN route was likely to mean different
things in
Washington
and London. Bush is undecided about a second resolution:
whether
it will
be worth going for and, if it is, what should be put in it. In
other words – as
of this
morning – Bush has not yet bought into the strategy which the Prime
Minister
put to him
last week.”254
766.
Reflecting the
difficulties which had arisen from ambiguity about the
messages
Mr Blair
had given President Bush during their meeting at Camp David in
early
September
2002, Sir Christopher concluded:
“There are
huge expectations here of Friday’s meeting and the press are
watching
like
vultures for splits. The Prime Minister will obviously want to
reach full agreement
254
Telegram
131 Washington to FCO London, 29 January 2003, ‘Iraq: PM’s
Visit’.
137