The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
473.
Adm Boyce
advised that:
“… the full
moon meant that a later start date […] would certainly be
preferable,
but that
the projected date was not a show stopper. The US military shared
the
preference
for a later date, but had been told to accept the earlier
date.”
474.
Sir David
Manning confirmed Mr Blair’s approval for the plan in a letter
to
Mr Watkins
the following day.143
475.
Reflecting
discussion at the JIC on 12 March, the Assessments Staff
produced
a JIC
Note on Saddam Hussein’s plan to defend Baghdad, on 13
March.144
The
detail
of the
JIC Note is addressed in Section 6.2.
476.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed withdrawing the resolution
on
17 March
followed by a US ultimatum to Saddam Hussein to leave within 48
hours.
There would
be no US military action until after the vote in the House of
Commons
on 18
March.
477.
Mr Blair
continued to press President Bush to publish the Road Map
because
of its
impact on domestic opinion in the UK as well as its strategic
impact.
478.
Mr Blair
also suggested their meeting in the next few days should
produce
“something”
on the UN “angle” addressing post-conflict issues.
479.
Mr Campbell
spoke to Mr Bartlett about the proposed meeting between
President
Bush and
Mr Blair.145
President
Bush was prepared to come to London but
Mr Campbell
(and
Mr Blair) considered that was “not what we
needed”.
480.
Sir David
Manning told Dr Rice that Mr Blair was keen to have a
meeting with
President
Bush and Mr Aznar but the weekend might be very difficult. The
political
situation
in the UK:
“… remained
extremely tense … Condi [Dr Rice] should not underestimate
the
political
pressure we were now under. There might be resignations from the
Cabinet
… We had a
huge fight on our hands. We needed all the help we could
get.”146
Sir David
emphasised the importance of the US publishing the Road Map to
influence
opinion in
the UK.
481.
Sir David and
Dr Rice also agreed the need for experts to discuss the
UK’s
proposals
for the role of the UN in a post-conflict Iraq. The main area of
debate was
143
Letter
Manning to Watkins, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: The Military
Plan’.
144
Note JIC,
13 March 2003, ‘Saddam’s Plan for Baghdad’.
145
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
146
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 13 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi
Rice’.
482