4.4 | The
search for WMD
•
I was
struck by General Franks’ caution on this when I saw him
([Mr Colin]
Powell [US
Secretary of State] has been dubious about finds going back
to
last summer
and I think this reflects a wide view in the US
military);
•
Your point
that our experience in Northern Ireland … shows that large
arms
caches can
be concealed for years …”
“Yes, we
did take military action in order to disarm Iraq of its WMD. But if
it turns
out that
under the pressure of the US/UK military build up, he disarmed
himself,
so be it.”
143.
Mr Straw
wrote that he understood that public appreciation of why military
action
had been
taken would be “enhanced” if there were “good finds”:
“But if we
carry on saying confidently that the material is there … and have
1,000
men doing
nothing but search for the next six months … and still nothing is
found,
what then?
Knowing it was there is not the same as knowing it is
there.”
144.
Mr Straw
concluded that, in the absence of significant finds, it would
become
“all the
more important” to demonstrate that post-Saddam Hussein Iraq was a
far better
place than
before. He was “wondering whether the whole US Administration”
really
appreciated
the imperative of “getting the water and power back on” and the
hospitals
working
fully.
145.
Mr Straw
said that he would call Mr Blair “to discuss all
this”.
146.
In relation to
WMD, Sir David Manning commented to Mr Blair:
“The key is
to find people not materiel – who can talk about Saddam’s
WMD
programmes/aspirations/deceptions.”72
147.
During the
visit to London on 23 April by Mr José María Aznar, the
Prime Minister
of Spain,
Mr Aznar and Mr Blair spoke to President Bush about
progress in Iraq,
including
plans to provide incentives for information about WMD
locations.73
In
Mr Blair’s
view, the
Coalition should present the search for WMD as its third priority,
after winning
the
conflict and humanitarian assistance:
“WMD was
not just a US/UK issue: the international community had been
searching
for twelve
years. It would take time.”
148.
In his minute
to Mr Straw’s Private Office reporting the outcome of the
Washington
talks on
the ISG on 21 and 22 April, Mr Dowse cautioned that a
“smoking gun” might not
72
Manuscript
comment Manning to Prime Minister on Minute Straw to Prime
Minister, 21 April 2003,
‘Iraq: the
Search for WMD and the Case for the War’.
73
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 23 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush and Aznar,
23 April’.
453